A Causal Theory of Revolution by Horn, Stephen James
W&M ScholarWorks 
Dissertations, Theses, and Masters Projects Theses, Dissertations, & Master Projects 
1987 
A Causal Theory of Revolution 
Stephen James Horn 
College of William & Mary - Arts & Sciences 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.wm.edu/etd 
 Part of the Political Science Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Horn, Stephen James, "A Causal Theory of Revolution" (1987). Dissertations, Theses, and Masters 
Projects. Paper 1539625398. 
https://dx.doi.org/doi:10.21220/s2-dg14-tb63 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses, Dissertations, & Master Projects at W&M 
ScholarWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations, Theses, and Masters Projects by an authorized 
administrator of W&M ScholarWorks. For more information, please contact scholarworks@wm.edu. 
A CAUSAL THEORY OF REVOLUTION
A Thesis 
Presented to 
The Faculty of the Department of Government 
The College of William and Mary in Virginia
In Partial Fulfillment 






This thesis is submitted in partial fulfillment of 














CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION...........................  1
CHAPTER II. A CAUSAL THEORY OF REVOLUTION.........  25
CHAPTER III. THE CUBAN EXPERIENCE................... 35
CHAPTER IV. THE REVOLUTION OF IRAN................. 51
CHAPTER V. THE OVERTHROW OF SOMOZA...............  69





The writer wishes to express his appreciation to Professor George 
Grayson under whose guidance this investigation was completed, 
for his patience, guidance and thoughful criticism throughout 
the investigation. The author is also indebted to Professors 




The purpose of this study is to examine whether certain modern 
revolutions lend themselves to a causal theory of revolution.
To achieve this a causal theory of revolution was devised, 
leaning strongly on existing works. A fresh theory was approached, 
not to break new ground or to disprove others, but to show the 
similarities between seemingly opposed theorists.;
Three modern revolutions were then chosen to test this theory 
Cuba 1959, and Iran and Nicaragua 1979.
It soon became clear that while factors of my theory existed 
in all three revolutions their importance varied. With this 
weighting firmly in mind the theory proved useful for the study 
of contemporary revolution.
The study concluded by examining the role of the Political Scientist 
in predicting revolution. The author calls for more study of 
modern revolution - both successful and unsuccessful. Further 





Between 1969 and 1983 there have been more than 200 articles about 
revolution listed in the ABC of Political Science. It is a very widely 
talked about and emotional subject. While revolution is not commonplace 
in today's world, it does occur often enough for us to regard it, not 
as Hobbes would have us believe, as an aberration of the political 
system, but rather as a part of contemporary political action that is 
extremely relevant to the modern student of politics.
The following brief tour of the literature concerning revolutions will 
show us that a good working definition is vital. A revolution is not a 
coup d'etat, a bread riot, or necessarily, a civil war. Revolution is 
sufficiently important to be studied in its own right and not just as 
a level of civil disobedience.
There are five snares of which writers in this field should be particul­
arly aware. First, revolutions are complex events. It is tempting, 
especially for the political scientist, to advance clear-cut and strong 
hypotheses to explain revolutions, but one should be extremely suspicious 
of simple causes that are offered to explain complex events. Second, no 
society is perfect. There are tensions in every society, be it 
democratic or non-democratic. Many of the problems presented as causing 
revolutions can be found in almost every society. There is always 
discontent, but this does not have to lead to revolution. Third, 
revolution is never inevitable. Some theorists get so carries away 
with their work that they believe that certain causes "demand" a 
revolution. (1) Fourth, we must always be careful to pay close attention 
to the facts. There is nothing more annoying for a student of politics
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than to be confronted with a theory in which the factual foot has been 
forced into the theorectical shoe. It immediately excites the student's 
suspicion and detracts from what might be a very worthwhile undertaking. 
Finally, I see no purpose in dressing a theory up in grandiose terms to 
make it more scientific. The causes of revolution are not simple; it 
does not promote understanding to make them more obscure by using 
esoteric language.
I have been able to include but an extremely small sample of the avail­
able literature on revolution. I do not pretend that the works mentioned 
here are necessarily the only important ones on the subject. I do feel 
they are reasonably representative and will give the reader a "feel" 
for the subject. I have divided seven of the ten works that I have 
studied into four categories; causal, sociological, psychological and 
economic. The other three works have been used to conclude the chapter 
by drawing together the main themes so that I can point to ways in 
which I feel future research might usefully proceed.
CAUSAL EXPLANATIONS
Crane Brinton (2) began by outlining some of the problems involved in 
writing about revolutions. He saw his work as setting the groundwork 
for others to follow. His introductory chapter made it clear that he 
feels it is imperative for the historian to have a basic conceptual 
scheme, rather than just a collection of facts. This lays to rest the 
fallacy that historians and social scientists need to follow contra­
dictory paths.
Brinton set to look at the causes of the English, French, American and 
Russian revolutions. While he hoped his findings might be relevant to 
other revolutions, he was quick to point out his conclusions only apply 
to those he is studying. He is not writing a general theory of 
revolution but one dealing with those four revolutions.
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Brinton began his analysis of the causes of revolution by looking at 
the reasons for the decline of the ancient regime. He realized there 
never has been a perfectly happy society and that the job of the 
student is to decide whether there is more discontent than normal in 
a particular society, and whether this discontent is likely to cause 
a revolution. The first cause that Brinton discussed is that of 
economic discontent. He maintains absolute economic discontent can 
add fuel to revolution; yet, as does de Tocqueville, he believes starving 
people rarely start a revolution. It is those groups that feel that 
their economic progress is being unfairly hindered that are more 
likely to rebel. Frequently this latter group is also hindered in 
social and political spheres. (A widely used example being the 
frustrated middle class in Bourbon France whose political and social 
mobility was hindered by antiquated class system).
The other side of the "economic coin" deals with government incompetence. 
Brinton noted there is no such thing as perfectly efficient government. 
However, the government, in times of revolution, is usually in 
particular financial difficulty. It is when an inefficient, repressive 
government tries to instigate civil war that financial difficulties 
often cause the government to grant limited reforms which satisfy 
nobody and give the revolutionaries hope for their goal.
What role do pressure groups play in promoting political instability? 
According to Brinton this depends on what sort of change the group 
is seeking and what means it is willing to adopt to bring about such 
change. If a group merely wants to reform facets of the existing 
society through constitutional means, its actions are not going to 
cause a revolution. It is when the group wants to replace the existing 
society with a totally new one that the chances of revolution increase.
The next symptom of revolution addressed by Brinton is that of the 
intellectuals deserting the government. Again Brinton stated it
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is always the job of the intellectual to criticize the society in which 
he lives. There is no such thing as a satisfied intellectual. The 
author here asks us to judge both the level of criticism and the 
number of intellectuals dissatisfied. Once having deserted the govern­
ment, the intellectuals help form the revolutionary ideology that 
makes that government appear a usurper of power.
Brinton then looked to class struggle as a cause of revolution. He 
stated there is often class struggle in society. The first struggle 
he looks at is within the ruling class. Inefficient, economically 
weak, divided and impotently repressive, the "ruling" class presents 
an inviting target for revolutionary overthrow.
Brinton said there probably has never been a society free of class 
conflict. When talking about class conflict, Brinton referred to 
tensions between the middle class and the elite. Members of the 
working class seldomly articulate their political thoughts so it is 
very hard to discern working class discontent beyond a certain economic 
level. (This economic discontent can manifest itself through such 
events as bread riots, strike and desertion from the army). The 
student must decide whether there is more conflict than normal in 
society.
Social mobility is likely to play a large role in class conflict. If 
members of the middle class see a relatively good chance of entry 
into the ruling elite through existing mechanisms, they are likely 
to support that elite. Brinton suggested that, within the societies 
he studied, there was significant degree of economic mobility, 
although socially and politically, there was very little movement.
This is a very dangerous contradiction because when people's expectations 
are raised they feel entitled to a political status comensurate with 
their wealth. Brinton also stated that circulation of the elites 
stops at particularly sensitive places, such as professions, where
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people whose aspirations are particularly strong find their prospects 
limited.
Brinton concluded his analysis of the causes of revolution by commenting 
on how difficult it is to predict revolution. One sign of imminent 
revolution is a great deal of revolutionary talk, but however astute
we may be, revolution is nearly always a suprise.
A revolution, Brinton would argue does not start with a bang. It is a
long process. In its early stages, it is hard to say a revolution
is taking place. While each revolution is, in many ways, different 
its beginnings evince important similarities because people acting 
in groups often follow certain procedures. One uniformity in the 
revolutions he studied was that governments were always trying to 
raise taxes, a measure which a large section of the people felt to 
be unjust. A second uniformity is that the early stages of a revolution 
are marked by the polarization of society into two groups: The battle 
lines are drawn. A third is the mix of the people involved in the 
revolution. There is always an alliance, however uneasy, between 
the mob and the provocateur. The final uniformity discovered by 
Brinton is a challenge of arms, when the revolutionaries come to 
the stage where they can openly challenge the government. Many theorists 
have subsequently agreed with Brinton on this questions. It would 
seem to be widely accepted that no government will fall until it 
is militarily weaker than the revolutionaries. This is a factor 
almost impossible to predict. Brinton summed up the difficulty by 
using the term "effective force." The government may be in command 
of a highly modern army, but if that army is not effective in revolu­
tionary combat, the government will collapse.
It has now been 45 years since Brinton's book was first published. 
Although it has drawn a lot of criticism, modern writers owe a debt 
to Brinton. There are two of his contributions I would specially like
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to stress. First, the book is extremely sensitive. Brinton is well 
aware of the problems of generalizing. The revolutions he studied 
actually happened, so it would be all too easy for him to "prove" 
why they happened and then to generalize rules to explain all 
revolutions. He recognizes most of the causes of revolution exist 
to some degree in every society and it would be extremely difficult 
for a contemporary student to forecast revolution. Second, despite 
these problems Brinton is not satisfied, as many historians in his 
era were, just to catalogue facts. He is trying to reach a theory 
that can be applied to at least four revolutions.
Nonetheless, there are still some criticisms of his work that are 
relevant to our study. I believe his first mistake is in failing 
to define what he is studying. As there is some doubt as to what 
constitutes a revolution, as opposed to coup d'etat or a revolutionary 
war, we need to know which events we are considering. Was there 
indeed ever an English or American revolution? Second, there are 
a few times when Brinton would appear to be making the facts fit 
his theory. In particular I find this to be the case with the 
English Civil War. He talked about the Cavaliers as being the ruling 
class although the conflict cut across borders. Third, Brinton's 
treatment of the roles of pressure groups and intellectuals is some 
what questionable. There are always pressure groups in society, and 
to decide when they become particularly influential is extremely 
difficult. Yet, making this determination is easy compared to trying 
to fathom whether the intellectuals are more anti-establishment than 
usual and whether or not their influence is increasing.
My main criticism of Brinton is that he did not weight his causes 
nor does he place them in any chronoligical order. When do we start 
looking for them? Do they come together? Are they all of equal 
importance, and, if so do they need to follow a certain sequence?
I believe Brinton identified a number of appropriate causes, but
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I would like to be told something of the relationship among them.
The work of Louis Gottschalk, an expert on the French revolution, 
differed from Brinton's in that it was intended to be general theory, 
rather than limited to four revolutions (3).
Gottschalk began with an analysis of the concept "cause". He defines 
it as "that from which something known as the result proceeds and 
without which the thing known as the result cannot happen". The 
cause must be antecedent to, and connected with, the result. The 
cause must be sufficient and necessary to bring about the result.
Gottschalk divided his causes into two categories: immediate and 
contributory. The immediate cause is always the single event without 
which the result cannot occur. Gottschalk used the example of war.
The immediate cause of war is "outbreak of hostilities between two 
or more countries." Knowing the immediate cause is not enough - 
we must look for the contributory causes. Here Gottschalk argued 
sensibly that we must make sure our contributory causes are related 
to the result.
Once the causes have been established, the student must not fall 
into the trap of saying the result must occur. A revolution is never 
predetermined. Even the most artfully constructed theories can never 
take into account the vagaries of human nature. Man sometimes does, 
and sometimes does not, learn from experience. Heving realized this, 
all that we can do is to say that if certain conditions exist within 
society one of the outcomes may be revolution.
Gottschalk continued by saying that complex events, such as revolution, 
demand complex causes. He briefly dismisses the Marxist theory of 
revolution, not because he perceives it to be wrong, but because 
he believes that no monistic theory can adequately describe revolution.
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He identified five main causes of revolution, which can be placed 
into three categories. The first two of these are the contributory 
causes and the last is the immediate cause.
His first category is that of demand. This can be further separated 
into two causes, the first of which is provocation. People need 
some reason to want to rebel. The second is crystalized public 
opinion. For people to start a revolution, they must be convinced 
of other people's discontent.
Gottschalk's second category is that of hopefulness. This category 
again embraces two parts. The first deals with a programm for reform 
and the second requires an able leader to draw all the various strands 
together.
Gottchalk's immediate cause, the third category, is the weakening 
of the ruling elite. This may come about through a split in the 
elite, or by the ruling elite losing the support of the armed forces. 
It is only when the conservative forces are sufficiently weakend 
that a revolution can occur.
Gottchalk's immediate cause is one which deserves the attention 
he devotes to it. As Eckstein (4) was quick to point out, too much 
emphasis has been placed on the revolutionaries and not enough on 
the weakness of the ruling elite. It may seem a trivial fact but 
it is worth repeating: A revolution can never succeed until the
revolutionary forces are stronger than the ones they are trying 
to overthrow.
Gottchalk's theory is very useful to the student of revolution.
He made three points that must be emphasized. To begin with, he 
noted that a revolution has complex causes. Furthermore, he pointed 
to the fact that it is necessary for a theory to fit the facts, 
not the other way around. Lastly, he recognized that, human nature
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being what it is, we can never say definitely a revolution will occur. 
There are weaknesses in Gottchalk's work. First, he did not specify 
what constitutes demand for a revolution. It is not enough to say 
there must be discontent. We need to know the type of discontent, 
whether absolute or relative, how much it takes to start a revolution 
and what framework in which to put it. While Gottschalk is correct 
in saying there must be a weakening of the elite, I think he needs 
to say more about the way in which the elite handles the initial 
discontent. The way in which the elite deals with unrest can have 
much to do with whether or not that discontent leads to a revolution. 
To say there must be solidified public opinion is another point 
with which I disagree. It is not very often that a revolutionary 
movement, at least at its onset, enjoys mass support. Finally, 
is there really need for a program for reform? A revolution might 
well be fought to make an unpopular ruler leave, rather than bring 
a new ruler to power. The revolution in Nicaragua was fought out 
of hatred of Somoza, rather than love for the Sandinistas.
If Gottschalk's theory is to be used to predict revolution it needs 
certain modifications. We must know what we are looking for, how 
much, and when. The types of discontent have to be specified and 
we require a framework in which to place them. Gottschalk's theory 
is very useful but must be refined.
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SOCIOLOGICAL EXPLANATIONS
One of the most widely read writers on revolution is Chalmer Johnson 
(5). He sees revolution as an extreme form of social change, and 
then questions the causes of social change. To answer this question 
he sets up a model society. This society is in equilibrium. What, 
he asks, would upset this equilibrium.
If one component of the system does not work as it should Johnson 
called this dysfunction. If this dysfunction is not rectified, 
the whole system will move out of equilibrium. The social system 
suffering from dysfunction is very much like the human body suffering 
from cancer. Therefore he defines social change as "action undertaken 
to alter the structure of the system for the purpose of relieving 
the condition of dysfunction ". (6)
What makes revolution different from other forms of social change? 
First, revolution occurs when peaceful reforms are not forthcoming. 
Revolutions are major changes. This is not to say that major changes 
are necessarily revolutions. There must also be violence, which 
usually takes place as the result of multiple dysfunction. There 
is a level of dysfunction within the social system below which 
revolution would not be an appropriate form of social change.
Revolution will not occur when the ruling elite is able to isolate 
and deal with challenges to the system. For a revolution to occur, 
the "cancer" must spread to more than one "cell" within the social 
system. Johnson states that there are three "accelerators" which 
act on the dysfunction to cause revolution. These are the rise 
of a messiah, the birth of a revolutionary political party, or defeat 
in a foreign war. I have five main problems with Johnson's work. 
First, I have trouble in accepting his limits of dysfunction. His 
ideal type model is useful, but it leaves us in danger of reducing 
his propositions on dysfunction to the level of the tautological.
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If we say revolution does not occur when society reacts non-violently, 
we must be able to set some sort of tolerance levels. If we do
not, we are reduced to saying that because there was a revolution
society was unable to adapt non-violently. Second, his use of defeat 
in a foreign war as a catalyst of dysfunction is too limited. He 
must take into account elite weakness as a whole. Third, I want
to know more about the sources of dysfunction. I need to know whether
all three carry the same weight and how many are needed to cause 
a revolution. Fourth, I feel that he is too deterministic when 
he says certain conditions demand a revolution. Finally, I feel 
revolution is not just an extreme forms of social change, but that 
it is a separate phenomenon and its causes need to be treated as 
such.
Barrington Moore present another theory of revolution (7) from studying 
eight countries Moore identifies three forms ofpolitical development.
(8) The first of these is the capitalist path of democracy, Moore 
states that Britain, France, and the United States took this path, 
the second path is that of a strong capitalist ruling class giving 
way to a weak liberal government which, in turn, gives way to Fascism. 
The third route is that of the Communist Revolution. Moore sees 
the prime factor in deciding which route was taken as the method 
of modernization within the society. To be more exact, he sees 
the mehtod of extracting the surplus from the peasants by the lords 
as being crucial. (9)
Moore would say while no society is immune to revolution, some are 
more prone than others. If the traditional peasant village stays 
intact, that society is more susceptible to revolution than one 
in which the peasants have already been driven from the countryside.
The lords will try to extract more out of the peasants in order 
to keep up with the elites in other, more modern countries. The 
peasants will not only resent this, but their respect for the lords 
will be further reduced if the central government takes over the
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lord's function of protector and lawmaker.
On one hand, the peasants will have to suffer economic discontent 
and, on the other hand, their traditional value systems will come 
under fire from the central government. Thus, Moore said the society 
in which the peasants communities subject to modern pressures and 
influence is the most vulnerable to revolution.
Moore's theory is in danger of being tautological. He said those 
countries which follow the capitalist path to democracy do so because 
their peasant have been driven off the land at an early stage.
He then said countries that developed along this path are those 
that forced the peasants off the land. Moore also framed his facts 
to support his theory; he attributes both the English Civil War 
and the Amercian Revolution to purely economic factors. He stated 
the second path ends in Fascism. He used Germany as an example, 
even though German Fascism lasted for only 12 years. Finally, 
even if we accept Moore's work, it is of no use to us in predicting 
the course of future events, as he himself admitted it is highly 
unlikely that any more countries will follow his first two paths.
PSYCHOLOGICAL CAUSES
One of the best known authors in the field of psychological approaches 
to revolution is Ted Robert Gurr (10). Gurr identified revolution 
as a type of civil disobedience. He said we now know enough about 
the sources of human violence to ask what disposes man to collective 
violence. According to Gurr, there are three traditionally recognized 
forms of human aggression. The first of these is innate, the second 
environmentally produced, and the third is a result of aggression, 
and instinctive response bought on by frustration. Gurr sees the 
last as being the most fruitful source for further inquiry. Men 
act violently because they are frustrated and angered in trying 
to achieve value goals. Once this anger has been raised, it acts
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on its own. Any type of violence is an outlet for this anger.
This, then, is Gurr's basic idea: for a revolution to occur there
must be anger, which is created through the frustration of value 
goals.
Gurr stated this theory by using 11 propositions. These he divides 
into three categories. Category I focuses on instigating variables 
to determine the amount of anger. Category M deals with mediating 
variables which determine the likelihood and magnitude of violence 
provoked by this anger. Category F indicates the type of civil 
violence which is likely to occur.
Gurr's first proposition, 1.1., deals with relative deprivation.
He defined relative deprivation as the "actors perception of the 
discrepancey between their value expectations and the environment's 
apparent value capabilities". (11) Gurr pointed out it is not enough 
for the actor to be deprived he must also perceive himself as being 
deprived. Civil violence occurs when a substantial number of people 
feel deprived. The more widespread the perceived deprivation, the 
more widespread the violence. The inability to reach value goals 
is not the only cause of deprivation. Deprivation is also caused 
when people anticipate losing what they already have.
Gurr's next propositions 1.2., I.2A., and 1. 2B., deals with intensity 
of the anger people feel when they suffer relative deprivation.
The more committed people are to a goal, and the closer they perceive 
themselves to be to that goal, the more anger they will feel when 
they cannot attain that goal.
Proposition 1.3., deals with the legitimacy of the authorities when 
they prevent people from reaching a goal. If people feel the author­
ities are acting legitimately, they will not be as angry as they 
would if they felt that the authorities were not acting legitimately.
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The environment in which people are striving for goals is the subject 
of Gurr's propostions 1.4. , and 1.5. The level of violence depends 
on the degree of interference with goal attainment and the number 
of attainment opportunities which are interfered with.
Propositions 1.1. to 1.5. deal with the strength of anger felt by 
those who suffer relative deprivation. Propositions M.1. to M.5. 
are mediating propositions which deal with the amount of violence 
which manifests itself as a result of this discontent.
Gurr's first mediating propositions, M.1. and M.1A. state the amount 
of civil violence is proportional to the anticipated reaction of 
the authorities. If people feel the authorities will react with 
strong repression, the level of civil violence is likely to be low.
The level of civil violence is also dependent on the time factor. 
Propositions M.2. and M.2A. state that if anger is repressed, that 
anger will rise. If repression eases, then violence will increase.
If repression continues over a long period of time, the amount 
of violence will decrease as people adapt their expectations to 
the new environement.
Frustration needs to be stimulated. This occurs throught cultural 
experiences and through ideology. These experiences clarify the 
situation and give the deprived a target for their aggresion. In 
proposition M.4. and M.4A., Gurr declared that while frustration 
is still requred for violence, the level of frustration required 
to cause a revolution declined when there are these cultural 
experience which can stimulate aggression.
Gurr's last mediating proposition, M.5., is concerned with the indi­
vidual acting as a part of a crowd. ‘ There are three factors of 
crowd action that affect the individual's dispostion towards violence. 
The first is the normative aspect. The individual is more likely to
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act violently if he believes his fellows feel the same way he does.
The second related to the protection a crowd offers through anonymity, 
potential force, and the existence of highly visable leaders who 
will assume responsibility for the crowd's action. The crowd also 
provides the individual with a cue for violence.
Gurr's last proposition, F.1. and F.1A., deals with the different 
types of violence. He separates civil violence into two categories; 
turmoil and revolution. He then divides revolution into categories, 
internal wars, which typically include civil and guerilla warfare; 
and conspiracy, which includes plots and mutinies. One way to deciding 
which type will prevail is to look at the group suffering the discon­
tent. A combination of mass and elite discontent will lead to internal 
war, while elite discontent is more likely to promote conspiracy.
Gurr's theory was based on the thesis that civil disobedience is 
caused by frustration, which comes about when people are prevented 
from reaching value goals. The way in which this frustration manifests 
itself as civil violence depends to a large extent on the reaction of 
the existing regime.
The strength of Gurr's theory lies in bringing together information 
from two areas of social science. Nevertheless, there are three 
problems that I have with his work. How relevant is a lot of the 
information used by Gurr? It is debatable whether laboratory experi­
ments, occasionaly performed on animals, can have a direct relevance 
to the causes of revolution. Gurr must also be very careful in 
his use of historical evidence. His treatment of both the Plug 
Riots and the Luddities leaves a good deal to be desired. Gurr 
is correct in saying that people's perceptions are important, but 
if his theory is to be used to predict revolution, we need to be 
able to measure the strength of this perceived deprivation. Finally, 
does anger always manifest itself in violence, and if it does, under 
what circumstances does this violence seek to bring down the regime?
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My point here is that anger sometimes does not produce violence.
Even when it does it often seeks to remedy a particular grievance, 
rather than to bring down the whole regime. A good example of this 
would be an industrial dispute.
ECONOMIC EXPLANATIONS
Perhaps the most famous and influential of all revolutionary theorists 
is Karl Marx. Many comtemporary "Marxist" states would appear 
to be anything but revolutionary. This should not distract us from 
the fact that Marx was, above all, a revolutionary theorist. (12)
Marx specified two strands of revolution, the social and the human. 
What then did Marx believe was the social revolution? Marx saw man 
as essentially a producer. The history of society could be divided 
into stages, each characterized by its own mode of production. The 
asiatic stage was characterized by slave labour, the feudal by serf 
labour, and the capitalist by wage labour. Within each stage there 
was a split between those who owned the means of production and 
those who did not. A new technology developed, the existing mode 
of production became outdated, and the ruling class was replaced 
by those who controlled the means of production.
The history of society can be seen in terms of class conflict. This 
is for two reasons; because the producing class see their own standard 
of living decreasing as a result of exploitation they are suffering 
for the ruling class; and, more important, because the working man 
is prevented from reaching his full productive capacities. The socio­
economic order prevents man from developing new economic capabilities.
As technology advances, the capitalist mode of production will become 
obsolete. The controllers of the new mode of production, the people, 
will take power as a communist revolution comes about. The rise in 
technology will create so much wealth, that greed will disappear.
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To Marx, man is a complete human being. Under the present mode 
of production, such specialization takes place as to prevent him 
from being so. The division of labour must be replaced if man is 
to reach complete freedom. This will happen within the communist 
revolution, as machinery will take over the productive role. Machinery 
will then be so advanced that any man will be able to fulfill any 
productive role for all he had to do is to work the relevant machine. 
The use of machinery will also leave man with more free time to 
perform such non-productive roles as art and writing.
The communist revolution will be the last revolution. When greed 
has been removed and the whole of society owns the means of production, 
there will no longer be a class system. Without class tension there 
will be no further revolution.
There are three main criticisms that can be made of Marx's theory.
One, even if we agree that economic causes are important, we are 
unlikely to accept them as the only ones. It would be hard to find 
a revolution in which economic discontent did not play a role, but 
equally, it would be difficult to find a revolution where political 
unrest was not present. Cuba provides an example of a revolution 
started by a class which was not suffering economic hardship. Two, 
for Marx to be correct, there needs to be a high degree of class 
conciousness, this does not exist in contemporary society.(13) Three, it 
would seem that the world is not turning out the way Marx said it 
would. There is no evidence to suggest that capitalism is floundering.
Another economic treatment of the causes of revolution was put forward 
by J.C. Davies with his "J" curve analysis of relative deprivation.
(14) The basic hypothesis advanced by Davies stated that revolution 
occurs, not when people are starving but rather, when a period of 
economic growth is followed by a sharp reversal. People's expectations 
rise when the standard of living rises. These expectations continue 
to rise even when there is sharp economical reversal, which frustrates
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them. This frustration is normally manifested in the face of an 
intransigent elite who will not give way to the frustrated peoples 
social petitions. They need hope to rebel; and they are too busy 
trying to stay alive to give it much thought.
Davies looked at his theory in the light of Dorr's rebellion in 1842, 
the Russian revolution of 1918, and the Egyptian rebellion of 1952.
Dorr's rebellion, Davies contended, was the first to occur in the 
United States as a result of the Industrial Revolution. This, and 
its date, puts it in the same genre as the Chartist revolts in Britain. 
Due to the Industrial Revolution, Rhode Island was urbanized, which 
led to a greater dependance on wage labour. From 1807 to 1815, there 
was an economic boom. From 1834 to 1842, there was a depression.
During this time, those who relied purely on wage income were partic­
ularly affected. It was this group whose expectations had risen 
especially high during the boom years, and with the economic 
expectations came political expectations. In 1841 the suffregists 
demands were turned down. In 1842 they held elections and declared 
a people's convention. The authorities stated this to be undemocratic 
and a month of widespread rioting followed. This seems to dovetail 
with Davies's theory that a period of economic prosperity, bringing 
with it higher expectations, will be followed by a depression. These 
frustrated people were confronted by an intransigent elite.
Davies pinpointed the start of the upsurge toward the Russian revolution 
at the emancipation of the serfs in 1861. He saw the growing popu­
lation rate and the new high wages in the factories as evidence 
for rising expectations.
There were also, he maintained improvements in the legal system 
that were to provide hope for more changes. Expectations continued 
to rise until 1905, which Davies say as the point of no return for 
the Russian revolution. The strikes of that year had the effect 
of polarizing people. The defeat of Russia in the 1904-05 war 
with Japan also had two outcomes: It brought home many disillusioned
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troops, and it shook the confidence of and severley weakened, the 
ruling elite. Davies sees the period of 1905 to 1917 as one of 
deepening despair. In 1910 there was a period of economic prosperity 
that raised hopes which were dashed again in the first years of 
the war.
Davies said the start of the Egyption upsurge occurred in 1922, 
Nationalistic and economic hope rose in 1945. The post war depression 
hit, but there was no revolution due to nationalistic upsurge following 
the outbreak of war with Israel. Defeat in that war was to weaken 
the government severely. The Korean war, and the subsequent cotton 
boom, again raised people's expectations, only for them to be dashed 
with the collapse of 1952.
Davies continued to consider more cases that fit in with his analysis. 
He then looked at a case one might have expected revolution and 
yet it did not occur. The United State in the 1930's would seem 
to be a good candidate for revolution. Davies said one did not 
take place there because of a solidified elite that seemed to be 
trying to relieve the problems of the poor.
I disagree with Davies on a number of points. Despite reassurances,
I find it hard to operationalize people's expectations. Is it enough 
to say that because people's living standards are rising, that all 
their expectations are rising too, and at the same rate? If indeed 
they are, how long does it take for these expectations to adjust? 
Davies's analysis of the Russian revolution is one with which partic­
ularly I disagree. It is not enough to say that the living standard 
of the serfs rose in 1861 just because the population rose. In 
many poorer societies the rising population can be attributed to 
people trying on one hand to provide for their old age, on the other, 
trying to ensure that as many children as possible would survive 
owing to the high infant mortality rate.
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The first problem arises out of the question of definition. Some 
social scientists, such as Gurr and Eckstein, would say that we 
should talk about a wider concept, such as internal war. All forms 
of civil disobedience, including revolution, use violence, so it 
makes more sense to talk of these collectively, rather than to 
distinguish revolution. Studied this way it will be easier to form­
ulate theories. Historians, such as Brinton and Stone, would disagree. 
To them the concept of internal war is both too broad and too narrow.
It is too broad because it talks of all forms of internal violence 
which are by no means comparable. It is too narrow because the 
concept of internal war is only applicable in non-violent societies.
The next question is whether we look at events and try to draw theories 
out of these, or do we look at behavioural theories dealing with 
why people act in a certain way. Gurr would argue it is people's 
perceptions that really count. We could point to many different 
events with similar causes and then ask why they came out differently. 
There is a good deal of truth in this. Yet, it is hard to measure 
perception. We must take their perceptions into account but must 
be willing to change our theories if the facts prove us wrong.
Do we look for a general theory or do we limit our theory to the 
cases we actually study? There can be little doubt that the former 
course is the more attractive. Indeed, there would seem to be no 
point in working over the same old revolutions again and again in 
the light of some new historical twists. This makes for interesting 
historical analysis but gets the social scientist nowhere in accounting 
for the present, let alone predicting the future. This is not 
to say that we would not analyze some more modern revolution and 
to see if standard "causal" theories are applicable.
My final point in this section is that there is a good deal more 
agreement here than many theorists admit. Some factors, such as 
relative deprivation and elite incompetence, are mentoned in almost
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every theory I have evaluated. There is even a good deal of agreement 
that theories on revolution should be based on preconditions and 
precipitants. One specific example of two, seemingly opposite, 
theorists agreeing, is the work of Gottschalk and Gurr. Both accept 
the important influence of the crowd on individual behaviour, but 
they approach it from different angles.
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CHAPTER II 
A CAUSAL THEORY OF REVOLUTION
I should now like to suggest tentatively my own theory of revolution.
My purpose in so doing is not to attempt to break new theoretical ground. 
I do not forecast any new discoveries, because I believe that if a 
number of political scientist look at similar events, they are likely to 
come up with similiar theories.(1) However, there are three reasons 
why I feel this work to be important. To begin with, there has been 
little or no attempt to try to fit modern revolutions into a causal 
model. A weakness of causal theorists is that they draw their evidence 
from the "classical" revolutions.(2) This reservation may well disarm 
the criticism of a new theory that it has no contemporary relevance.
In addition, while this is a causal theory, it will draw heavily on 
psychological and sociological work. Lastly, even though this theory 
is not exactly the same as other causal theories, conclusions emerging 
from this work may be relevant when looking back at earlier studies.
There is enough in common with studies such as those of Gottschalk and 
Brinton for us to be able to say whether the nations studied here lend 
themselves to a causal explanation of revolution. My reason for out­
lining my own theory is not to disprove the finding of others. I am 
more comfortable working with such a theory, and, I hope, it will 
prevent my misrepresenting the facts.
All theorists of revolution must start with a definition. At this 
point many theorists will either enter into a thesis-long discussion on 
the subject or give up writing. My definition of a revolutionary move­
ment is a mass movement seeking to bring about radical political, social, 
economic, and cultural reform through violent means. This definition 
does not set out to be watertight, but rather, a working definition
Before outlining my theory, I would like to point to its limitations
(3), I believe we can never be in a position to say revolution
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is inevitable. We can only point to certain factors and state that, 
if they occur in a given sequence, one of the possible outcomes 
is revolution, furthermore, any conclusions drawn from this work 
will apply only to the revolutions studied, but this is not to negate 
an earlier point. I believe it is necessary to compile case studies 
which are related to one approach to the subject. While similarities 
may appear, definite conclusions may not follow. One of the reasons 
for the "comparative" weakness lies with differing methodologies, 
but, I believe, the main reason lies with human nature and circumstances. 
People never react in exactly the same way. All my theory can do 
is to recognize some of the factors that cause revolution, and to 
state that where these factors occur, a revolution may follow.
Revolutionary causes appear to fit into three stages. These are 
the preconditions, the precipitants that bring about the revolutionary 
situation, and the culmination of all these factors that leads to 
the revolutionary spark. This spark may or may not lead to a revol­
ution. There are also a list of observations which, although they 
do not betray any category, give us a valuable insight into the 
working revolution.
At this point I would like to introduce an analogy which might make 
the rest of this work, a little clearer - that of the fire. To 
start a fire you need firewood, a precondition. If the wood is 
strewn all over the ground, it is of very little use. The firewood 
must be gathered and shaped until a stack is created. This shaping 
is done by the precipitants. The stack is a revolutionary situation.
A spark is then needed to set the fire, or revolution. Once the 
fire has started it will burn more and more fiercely until it all 
but burns out, with only the embers still glowing, while we fashion 
the wood in any shape we wish, we cannot be certain about the direct­
ion the fire will eventually take. Other factors, such as the wind 
and the rain, may come along and change our plans. The same is 
true of revolutions. We know that there is a revolution taking
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place in Iran and Nicaragua and, although we may try to predict 
the outcome, factors other than preconditions and precipitants may 
well intervene to alter our predictions.
PRECONDITIONS
What then are the preconditions for a revolution? Preconditions 
are the reasons for discontent within a country. They account for 
the willingness of people to rebel. They do not have to be immediately 
antecendent to the revolution; they can have existed for some time.
They do not have to occur simultaneously but must be cumulatively 
sufficient to promote discontent. Even if all exist we cannot say 
that a revolution must take place; all that we can say is that pre­
conditions are the most common forms of discontent. Without them, 
there is little chance of revolution. Unlike certain other students 
of revolution, I find that it helps our understanding if we list 
these "frustrations".
Perhaps the most important precondition of all is that of economic 
discontent. This must be present for a revolution. It is not 
necessarily the most important factor, but there has been no 
revolution in which it played no part whatsoever. People are extremely 
concerned over economic matters and, to put it bluntly, they would 
rather eat than vote. (4) There are two forms of economic discontent 
which are of interest to us here: absolute and relative deprivation.
In the last chapter, I noted that theorists such as Gurr, de Tocqueville, 
and Davies disagreed with Marx when he stated it is absolute deprivation 
which makes man rebel. I would add that it is not a question of 
either absolute or relative deprivation. A revolution is caused 
by a coalition of people, some driven by absolute deprivation, and 
some by relative deprivation.
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Most people, at some time or other, perceive themselves to be deprived. 
Yet the remedy is seldom revolution. How do you decide when deprivation 
is strong enough to lead men to rebel? Measuring absolute deprivation 
is comparatively straight forward. Here we need to look at harvest 
records, mortality records, and accounts of discontent caused by 
lack of food, such as bread riots. Relative deprivation is not 
so easy. In this case we are dealing with perceptions. We can 
tell if a man is not getting food. However, we cannot tell if he perceives 
himself to be getting less food than he deserves. There are two 
angles from which we might consider this question. Davies had a 
point when he said one method would be to measure people's living 
standards. It is a reasonable suggestion that if living standards 
rise, as measured by per capita income, ownership of consumer durable 
goods (such as television, etc) housing conditions, death rates, 
illiteracy rates etc they will be expected to continue. If living
standards do not continue to rise in line with expectations, people
will feel deprived. Yet, this is only one way of looking at the
question. I believe that it will differ between cultures as to
how much expectations risp, and how quickly they will adjust to a 
reverse. People who have suffered reversals in the past will be 
much better able to adapt than those who have not (5). I think, 
therefore, we must also analyze carefully the literature produced 
by those suffering discontent and try to discover from these works 
why people are discontented. If people act because of their perception, 
they also write because of them. In this way we will have a better 
understanding of the causes of rebellion.
If a revolution were caused by economic discontent alone, the world 
would be in a state of constant revolt. Political discontent also 
plays a key causal role. The existing regime must use its repressive 
capabilities - namely the military, the police and legal system, 
and propaganda, to prevent effective political opposition. If the 
regime allows opposition, there is a good chance that this opposition 
will work for reform. A possible revolutionary situation will therefore
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be diffused. By allowing the opposition a say in the decision­
making process, the regime is working at the root of possible 
discontent. If the regime allows no opposition, pressure for 
revolution will build.
The chances of revolution in modern America or Britain remain slim 
as long as there remains abundant opportunity to voice discontent, 
and reasonable access to the decision-making process. In nations 
such as fuedal France, Batista's Cuba and 20th Century Iran, such 
opportunity was not present. This gave those discontented with 
the governing regime no alternative but to revolt.
My third precondition is that of ideology. By ideology I am referring 
to a collection of beliefs and values which hold the various strands 
of the revolutionary movement together. For this ideology to be 
revolutionary, it must be contrary to the ideology of the ruling 
elite. Ideologies are extremely important because they give people 
something around which to unite. The most important role of ideology 
is that of legitimizing the revolt and converting into a moral struggle. 
People who believe they are fighting for what is right are far more 
likely to be willing to sacrifice their lives than are those interested 
soley in economic gain. Ideology has played a vital part in revolution: 
Marxism in the Russian revolution, religion in the Iranian revolution, 
and humanism in the French revolution.
PRECIPITANTS
There will be no revolution without precipitants to transform the 
preconditions into a revolutionary situation. I see the precipitants, 
effective leadership, ineffective reaction of the regime to existing 
discontent, and inability of the regime to hold on to power through 
physical force.
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Leaders have a crucial role to play in precipitating a revolution.
They are needed to organize the revolution movement and to articulate 
the ideology. In the cases where the movement is fragmented, leaders 
are needed to bring the fractions together through coalitions, giving 
the people a united front to support. The crucial role of the leaders 
is to give the people hope, a vital part of the success of any 
revolution. People need to know that they are not fighting alone 
and that the sacrifices they are making will not be in vain. A 
classic example of the role of leadership has been seen in Cuba.
While it is undeniable that there was considerable economic and 
political discontent in Cuba, without Fidel Castro's involvment 
the revolution might not have taken place. Batista may well have 
been weak; but without someone to challenge him he could well have 
stayed in power.
Once it has been established that there is economic and political 
discontent in a country, the way in which the regime reacts to the 
discontent is crucial to the outcome of the revolution. If it attacks 
the preconditions, the chances of revolution are reduced. However, 
there are three approaches the government might select, or a combination 
of all three, that are likely to increase the chances of revolution. 
First, the government may try to repress mercilessly the movement.
This repression is usually highly indiscriminate, and there is no 
attempt to discern between the revolutonaries and the population 
at large. Second, a government may tend to ignore the unrest and 
try to carry on as usual. Third, the government may grant piecemeal 
reform that does not resolve the problems at hand. The third approach 
is the least likely to work in diffusing a revolutionary situation.
The only real answer for the regime is to try and deal with the 
causes of discontent and attempt to create a power base within society. 
(6)
A regime will fall if it has no legitimacy, and relies purely on 
military means for survival. The length of time it stays in power
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will depend on the effective strength of its military and police.
Put simply: the regime will fall when it is weaker than the forces 
trying to overthrow it. The strength of the revolutionary forces 
is clearly important but there will be no revolution unless the 
conservative forces are weakened. This weakness is impossible to 
measure. All we can do is look for signs, such as economic and 
political discontent among the military; low morale, poor training 
and equipment, and lack of combat experience.
Weakening of the regime can take place in a number of ways. The 
government may have been involved in overseas wars that have devastated 
the economy and provoked discontent. Prime examples are Russia 
and Portugal. Economic problems may have lead to each regime's 
inability to buy off political discontent. This often happens when 
the bourgeoisie has been willing to tolerate a denial of political 
power in return for economic benefits. When there benefits are 
withdrawn, the middle class will withdraw its political support 
from the government. Revolutions are often started by a politically 
alienated bourgeoisie and an example of this is the French Revolution. 
This group has the political knowledge to make their protest effective, 
the regime might also be further weakened by dependence on a foreign 
power which then withdraws its support. Examples here would be 
the withdrawal of U.S. support from the Shah's Iran and from Gemayel's 
Lebanon.
Gottschalk, with good reason, pointed to the repressive capability 
of the regime as the key factor in bringing about a revolution.
Even if all the other preconditions and precipitants are present, 
the regime will not fall if it is militarily strong enough to retain 
power. The present-day government of Afghanistan, for example, 




When these preconditions and precipitants converge, we can say we 
have a revolutionary situation which may or may not turn into a 
revolution. If it does, there are specific events that indicate 
a revolution is taking place. One such of these was the flight 
of the Shah of Iran from Teheran in 1978. This is not to say that 
the revolution will necessarily succeed, but rather that it is underway.
There are some additional points which are pertinent to our discussion. 
If, when the old regime is toppled, there is no mass movement, it 
is not a revolution. It is merely a circulation of elites, perhaps 
a "palace coup". In this respect, I would say the English Civil 
War was not a revolution because society was still dominated by 
the same class. Further, revolutions are unlikely to take place 
in urbanized, industrialist, pluralistic democracies. The political 
institutions in these states are too well established and considered 
too legitimate for the regime to fall. Any discontent is channeled 
through these institutions, avoiding a potentially dangerous situation. 
Even if discontent manifests itself by other means, the regime is 
unlikely to fall, becuase the state possesses such powerful repressive 
regulatory mechanisms as the socialization process, the media and 
the military, with which to counter a revolutionary organization.
If the state is forced to rely on such mechanisms, it might eventually 
fall. To maintain long term stability, the state must enjoy legitmacy. 
Whilst recognizing that revolution seldom occurs in modernized states,
I must also point out that they are unlikely to occur in primitive states. 
In such states people are more concerned with staying alive than with 
revolution. It is on those countries undergoing change and in which 
fundamental values are being challenged that revolution is most likely 
to occur.(7) It was during this phase that Cuba, Iran and Nicaragua 
underwent revolution. It was during modernizing phase that Britain 
came closest to revolution.
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Finally, you cannot have revolution through reform. To achieve 
a revolution, you must exterminate those groups within society that 
oppose you. This can either be done by expelling dissidents or 
by eradicating them through a reign of terror. By attempting to 
achieve revolutionary goals through existing power structures, you 
are continuously fighting vested interests that will eventually get 
in your way. A good example of where a revolution failed for just 
this reason is Chile. By having to work through conservative 
politicians and not being able to reform the military, Allande faced 
a difficult task. I began this discussion by asking whether a theory 
of revolutions is possible and concluded that it is. My theory 
states that to bring about a revolutionary situation, you need economic 
political and ideological preconditions. These are then acted on 
by the precipitants of leadership, the reaction of the existing 
regime to unrest within society and the military strength of that 
regime.
My theory does not indicate if all the factors outlined are present 
there must be a revolution. All it says is that if these factors 
are present, one of the possible outcomes would be a revolution.
It is also true that no single revolution is exactly the same as 
another. This means no single theory can explain every facet of 
every revolution without being so vague that it means nothing. I 
do think revolutions have enough in common for us to tentatively 
postulate a theory of revolution.
This theory has enough in common with other causal theories to be 
Tabled as such. As a consequence, the purpose of this paper is 
to look at the revolutions in Cuba, Iran and Nicaragua to see, 
not only whether or not they fit my theory, but also to see whether 
they fit causal explanations in general.
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E. Nordlinger, "Soldiers in Mufti", The American Science 
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CHAPTER III
THE CUBAN EXPERIENCE
There are, as Goldenberg pointed out, a number of fallacies circulated 
concerning the Cuban revolution.(1) The purpose of this chapter is 
to expose some of these fallacies and to determine the compatibility 
of the Cuban experience to my theory. However, at the onset there
is a problem concerning data, which is the case with most Latin American
Countries.(2) The most recent "reliable" pre-revolutionary statistics 
are those of the 1953 census. These must be taken into context in as
much as 1953 was not a good year for the Cuban economy.(3)
Another problem is deciding with which countries to compare Cuba. The 
question is whether to compare Cuba with the rest of Latin America, or 
with its neighbour, the United States. A good example of this dilemma 
can be seen when looking at literacy figures. In 1953, 76.4% of Cuban's 
people over 10 years of age were literate. This would have put Cuba 
fourth among Latin American States, yet this figure would be unsatis­
factory when compared with the United States.(4) Even if we decide 
to concentrate on Latin America, we have problems concerning which 
countries to compare Cuba with, and which factors to choose for such 
a comparison.(5)
Which, then, are the fallacies I would like to expose? The picture 
has been given of Cuba as a slave-based colony of the United States, 
centered totally on sugar. The exploited peasants of this underdeveloped 
nation rose to overthrow the tyrant, Batista.(6) This was simply not 
the case.
It would be hard to argue that Cuba was making the best of its potential, 
but this is not the same as saying it was underdeveloped. Sugar was 
extremely important to the economy, and culture, but less than 25% of 




In short, a social interpretation on the Cuban revolution 
must begin with a view of Cuban society that is far more 
urban, far less agrarian, far more middle class, far less 
backward, than it has been made to appear. In Castroist 
propaganda and the speeches of Castro himself, one of the 
most complex and advanced Latin American countries has been 
flattended out into a one-dimensional, hopelessly backward, 
agrarian fantasy that "has not developed economically or 
technically for dozens of years".(7)
There can be no doubt that conditions for the peasants in the mountains 
were hard.(8) Yet to focus on this is to miss the point. There 
conditions were typical and there never was, until just before 
Batista's fall, a large peasant army. Cuba, like all nations had 
its problems, but it is only with hindsight that we can see how they 
led to revolution. It was not clear until Batista fled the country 
that there would be a successful revolution.
Not only was it not clear that there would be a revolution in Cuba, 
but, it was also not clear that Fidel Castro would lead it. Given 
the role that Communist played in the revolution, it is even more 
surprising to note their role in post-revolutionary Cuba. By examining 
the causes of the Cuban revolution, the following analysis seeks 
to put these questions into perspective.
There are three questions we need to consider if we are going to 
shed light on the causes of the Cuban revolution. To begin with, 
which class accomplished the revolution? One side of the argument 
would term it a middle-class revolt, while the official party line 
would say it was a peasant-oriented agrarian revolt.(9) Moving on, 
what exactly was the economic position within Cuba before the revolution?
Finally, what was the extent, and the effect, of U.S. involvement 
in Cuba? I hope to answer these questions in the following analysis.
I would like to begin by repeating my definition of a revolutionary move­
ment; "A revolutionary movement is a mass movement seeking to bring about
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radical, political, social and economic change through violent means".
How well does the Cuban experience fit this definition?
To answer this question by stating that Fidel Castro's forces in 
the Sierra Maestra were the revolutionary movement in Cuba, would 
be taking a very simplistic point of view. To begin with, Castro's 
group was not a mass organisation. We do not know the amount of 
tacit support given to Castro. We do know his "army" never exceeded 
800 men.(10) It might be argued that Castro was the leader of a 
much larger movement. To be sure, there were many other such groups 
but they were in no way subordinate to Castro.(11) Despite attempts 
at unification, these groups were very much autonomous units.
Was there a mass movement? When Batista fell, the mass of the people 
were content with this overthrow. As evidence for this statement 
I would point to the celebrations which met, and the lack of resistance 
to, the defeat of Batista. The size of Catro's army, put by most 
observers at fewer than 1,000 men, would seem to indicate there was 
no mass movement actively seeking Batista's overthrow. It is more 
likely that while only a small number of men led the fight against 
Batista, they were representing a majority of the people in their 
wish to see him depart. Therefore, there is no evidence to suggest 
there was mass movement trying to overthrow Batista, only that the 
revolutionary movement had at least tacit support.
The next question is whether this movement pursued radical reform.
There would be two good reasons for saying it did not: The statements
of the revolutionary leadership point to nothing more radical than 
a wish for the reinstatement of the 1940 constitution. (12) Furthermore, 
two groups supporting Castro, the younger middle class and the peasants 
from the Sierra Maestra, did not want radical reform. Elements within 
the bourgeoisie supported Castro because they felt the Cuban economy 
was stagnant, due to cumbersome labour laws and government corruption.
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While they wanted these obstacles removed, they certainly did not 
want nationalization of industries. The peasants who supported Castro 
wanted agrarian reform, but not of the genre later provided by Castro. 
They wanted to own their own land and had little enthusiasm for the 
collective farms instigated by Castro.(13)
The reforms instituted by Castro, once he had assumed power, were 
evidence enough of how radical he truly was.(14) His moderate pre­
revolutionary stance can be ascribed perhaps to both his immature 
political philisophy and his need to gather widespread support for 
his movement. However his swift replacement of moderate members 
of his cabinet is a further indication of where his sympathies lay. (15)
In 1958 there was a considerable group who advocated the overthrow 
of Batista. There were also leaders who wanted to see radical reform, 
but this is not to say that all those sought the overthrow of Batista 
agreed with all that Castro did after the revolution. This was very 
much an anti-Batista rather than a pro-Castro movement.
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PRECONDITIONS
Was there sufficient economic discontent in Cuba to cause a revolution? 
In dealing with Cuba it is important to notice the very close tie 
between economic and political discontent. It is also necessary 
to link those who suffered with those who rebelled. It is not enough 
to point to suffering as a cause of revolution unless it is the people 
who suffered who also revolted.
There are three angles from which I would like to approach this problem. 
In the first place, I would like to ask how much absolute deprivation 
there was in Cuba, and whether this helped the revolutionary movement.
I would then like to consider how much relative deprivation there 
was on the island. Finally, I shall look at some of the nation's 
problems that led to a weakening of the economy.
Cubans can be divided between those who worked in the city and those 
who worked on the land. For the purpose of this discussion, I am 
going to concentrate on the rural population. According to the census 
of 1953, 817,000, or 42% of the working population worked on the 
land. The sugar industry employed 474,053 of these. Work in the 
sugar industry was seasonal, and at harvest time the unemployment 
was a bearable 8%. When it was not harvest time, unemployment rates 
reached 32%, or more than the U.S. unemployment rates during the 
great depression.(16) The majority of workers were tenant farmers.
In the 1930's, legislation had been passed to give them security 
of tenure at a very low rent. Those who were especially badly hit 
by seasonal trends were the squatters. While they accounted for 
only 8% of the agricultural population, they were centred around 
the Sierra Maestra.(17)
Even Castro agreed that during Batista's term income was being more
evenly distributed in Cuba. He wrote
Since 1933 Cuban distributive policy has, as the result 
of wage increases, the introduction of the eight-hour day
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paid holidays, social insurance etc, brought about 
a juster distribution of the national income.(18)
In certain rural districts of the country there was still abject poverty.
(19) It was in these regions, especially the Sierra Maestra, that 
Castro gained, at least tacit, support. Yet if we are looking for 
a revolution caused by absolute deprivation this is not the place 
to turn.(20) Cuba was, on a Latin American scale relatively prosperous.
(21) Though it is undoubtably true that Castro gained support from 
the poor this was not his only, nor even main, recruiting ground.
We must look further for an adequate economic interpretation of the 
Cuban revolution.
The question of relative deprivation is, as I commented in my introduction, 
a tricky one. It is hard to work with people’s perceptions. The most 
active groups in the Cuban revolution were the students and the younger 
members of the middle and professional classes.(22) How far can 
we point to relative deprivation as a reason for this discontent?
There are two forms of economic frustration which are of interest 
here. While the older members of the middle class made money from 
farming and business, and were therfore quite happy with the Batista 
regime, their sons were being drawn into the liberal professions and 
to the government bureaucracy. However, the economy could not support 
so many in these fields. These young graduates, whose expectations 
were raised through their university education, faced limited chance 
of professional employment, and a corrupt government bureaucracy.
Those who were technically trained became increasingly disillusioned 
with Cuba's fast stagnating economy, and became more and more attached 
to the idea of replacing Batista.(23)
Cuba was an Island with great economic potential. More than 70% of 
its land was fertile and 50% of it was arable compared with only 6% 
in Nicaragua, and 8% in Iran.(24) In addition Cuba had plentiful 
labour and capital.(25) The problem was not that Cuba was backward,
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but, rather, that it had failed to make the most of its opportunities,
as Draper cited.
Although Cuba's potentials for development clearly have 
not been fully utilized, these comparisons show that it 
is a mistake to think of Cuba as a seriously underdeveloped 
country.(26)
What then were the main problems with the Cuban economy? Firstly 
the Cuban economy was still centered around sugar. While it is a 
mistake to think of Cuba as a one-crop economy, sugar accounted for 
80% of the nation's export earnings.(27) There were two reasons for 
this: First, the climate and soil were perfect for sugar growing.
Second, the United States provided an extremely lucrative market.
This had three main consequences: high unemployment due to the seasonal 
nature of the industry, restricted diversification into other fields 
and a reliance on world market forces outside Cuba's command.
The second economic problem involved Cuba's dependant relationship 
with the Unted States. The question is whether Cuba lost or gained 
from its close links with its northern neighbour? On the credit side 
must be placed the massive U.S. investment in Cuba. North American 
firms invested, by 1960 $1,000 million. More than 160,000 people 
were employed by these firms, 90% of whom were Cubans. In 1957 American 
firms spent $70 million in taxes - 20% of the Cuban budget.(28) On 
the debit side were American pressure on Cuba to develop sugar and 
the quota system which the United States later employed. On the whole, 
Cuba gained from its relationship with the United States. This did 
not stop the revolutionaries from complaining about "economic slavery". 
What was really needed was a strong Cuban government which could 
negotiate with the United States use Cuba's resources to diversify 
and modernize.
The third major problem with the Cuban economy wa the top-heavy ineff­
icient beauracracy. In 1950 nearly 80% of the budget was used to 
pay officials and holders of sinecures. In the same year, approximately 
11% of the working population, half the number employed in the sugar 
industry, was employed by the government.
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Cuba was not economically underdeveloped. Some of its peasants suffered 
dire hardship largely due to underemployment, but this was not really 
the cause of revolution. However, the economy was stagnating. This 
was particularly frustrating to the generation of students and young 
middle-class professionals. The United States made a perfect scapegoat, 
and Batista's handling of the situation did nothing to improve matters.
It must be with this last point in mind that we turn our attention 
to the political unrest which existed in Cuba. There can be little 
doubt that the economic discontent in Cuba, on its own, was not enough 
to cause a revolution. While it is difficult to draw the line between 
economic and political discontent, it would seem to make sense to 
identify political discontent as more important than economic. For 
the purpose of this section I would like to look at who revolted and 
why. I would also like to consider the political background against 
which this took place. The United States has a long history of inter­
vention in Cuban affairs. By the 1890's Americans had $30 million 
invested in the Cuban sugar industry, with the result that 10% of 
Cuban sugar was processed by American Mills. In 1898 the United States 
intervened in Cuba's wars of independence with Spain. In 1902 Cuba 
received independence, and the Platt Ammendment, which gave the United 
States the legal right of intervention in Cuban internal affairs.(30)
On August 13, 1933, President Gerardo Machado fled the country in 
the midst of serious unrest, the result of which was the coming to 
power in 1935 of Fulgencio Batista. Batista instituted free elections 
for a national constitutional assembly which drew up the progressive 
1940 constitution. Surprisingly, in 1944, Batista's appointed successor, 
Dr. Carlos Saladrigas, was defeated by the Autenticos party, which 
was to hold the Presidency until Batista once again seized power in 
1952. The brief introduction to Cuban political history demonstrated 
both the U.S. influence in Cuban affairs and the lack of a stable 
political culture.
Against this background, what sparked the political unrest that led 
to Batista's overthrow? When Batista took power on March 10, 1952,
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he was running third, behind Dr. Robert Agramonte and Dr. Carlos Hevia
in the polls for the upcoming presidential election. To put it simply,
he took power illegitimately. Batista obtained cooperation from the 
army and police, thanks to considerable pay increases. The demands 
of the economic rather than political urban working class were satisfied, 
mainly by the social benefits granted by Batista.(31) Their lack 
of political protest is summed up by their refusal to strike on April 9, 
1958.
Two main groups opposed Batista, and forced an uneasy alliance which 
was to cause his ultimate downfall. These were the bourgeois remnants
of the Autentico and Orthodix parties, and students, mainly from the
University of Havana. (The two revolutionary groups coming out of 
the Autentico Party were: the Friends of Aureliana (AAA), and the 
Autentico Organisation (OA).)
The student opposition to Batista stated as soon as he took power.
Castro himself instigated a case in the Supreme Court which sought 
a judicial finding that Batista's takeover was unconstitutional.
Needless to say, this effort was treated with disdain. On May 20, 1952, 
a mass meeting at the University called for resistance to Batista.
This opposition did not stop until the overthrow of Batista. The 
cause of political discontent, at least, is clear: Batista's illegal 
capture of power.
How prevalent a role did ideology play in the Cuban revolution?
To answer this question we need to look at the importance of ideology 
before and after the revolution took place.
There is very little trace of ideology before the revolution. Draper 
argued that "during the struggle for power and for about a year or 
two after power had been won, Castroism seemed to be a movement without 
theory or ideology".(33) Two factors buttress this conclusion: First,
it was in Castro's interest to be ideologically vague. In this manner, 
he could promise everything to everybody and not attract criticism
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because of an ideological stance. Second, Castro was a man of action 
not of theory.(34) It was Che Guevara who was to become the main 
theorist, after the revolution was successful.
Guevara began his formulation of Castroism in January 1959. Castroism 
is basically Cuban, but can be applied in principle to the whole of 
Latin America, according to Guevara. The theory revolves around, 
and glorifies the role of the peasant fighter. Deemed the vanguard 
of revolution,(35) because of his commitment to the overthrow of 
illegitimate institutions, Guevara was fighting for agrarian reform.
It was not necessary for favourable conditions to pre-exist, they 
could be created.
How much is this theory based on the struggle to overthrow Batista, 
and how far was it intended to justify Castro's political fight after 
Batista's fall? There can be little doubt that the rudiments of this 
theory came out of the Sierra Maestra. The early part of Guevara's 
work appeared in early 1959, and most of it could be drawn from speeches 
that Castro made around the same date. Due to the split in the revolu­
tionary alliance between the former underground resistance and the 
rebel army, it is clear that it was in Castro's interest to emphasize 
the role of the peasant fighter in the struggle to overthrow Batista. 
While Guevara denied it strenuously, a good deal of his thoeory on 
guerilla warfare would appear to have inflenced by Mao's work on the 
same subject.(36)
Guevara must have learned many of his lessons throught practical 
experience. However, even if his theory was original, we cannot place 
too much emphasis on a piece of work formulated after an event. I 




The first of my precipitants is the role of leaders in a revolutionary 
struggle. What is Castro's role in this model? No doubt that charismtic 
young lawyer played a central part in the overthrow of Batista just 
as he continues to play the leading role in contemporary Cuba. A 
discussion of his personal attributes and rise to power, though a 
fascinating subject, lies beyond the scope of this paper. Could 
anyone have succeeded when he did? The best way to answer this question 
is to ask why Castro won power when so many other failed.
The Cuban revolution was not inevitable. Moreover, it was not certain
that Castro would lead the movement to overthrow Batista. Why then, 
did the competing organizations fail?
Three reasons help account for the failure of these organizations. To 
begin with, there was a lack of coordination between groups. Even 
when they did work together, as in the Montreal accord of June 2, 1953, 
the results were unsatisfactory (37) Second, while the students were 
enthusiastic, their plans were often badly conceived, as exemplified 
in the abortive March 1957 attempt on Batista's life.
Finally, these other groups faced one more problem; Castro himself.(38)
Not only did he want Batista overthrown, Castro was determined to
be the one to do it. He never gave up his committment to the revolution 
nor his conviction that a successful revolution could take place.
His ability to inspire, and perceived concern for those around him 
made Castro one of Latin America's great leaders. It would be impossible 
to overemphasize the role Castro played in the Cuban revolution.
As we have seen, Batista ignited the political discontent through 
his illegitimate seizure of power in 1952. How did he deal with this 
discontent? Though nobody really knows the result of the Batista 
terror, it would seem that official reports of 20,000 dead are far
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from accurate.(39) It was an inefficient and indiscriminate affair.
(Army mopping-up campaigns probably did the best job of recruiting 
peasants into Castro's army). Batista was still trying to maintain 
the facade of a semi-democratic nation, but by allowing a degree 
of press freedom and by granting the "Moncada Amnesty", Batista was 
promoting his downfall. Legends of Batista's working 16 hours a day 
were untrue. It is said that when he should have been organizing 
a campaign to defeat Castro, he was too busing playing Canasta.(40)
Batista fled the country on December 31, 1958. The "army" with which 
Castro confronted him numbered fewer than 1,000 men. Batista's regime 
collapsed with the minimum amount of pressure from Castro. Without 
denigrating the role of Castro, the Cuban revolution is the story of 
the fall of Batista rather than the rise of Castro.
Batista had never managed to legitimize his power. The working class 
and the peasants were, at best, apathetic. Student groups and other 
elements of the middle class constantly agitated against him because 
they felt that he had seized power illegally. This seizure and the 
stagnation of the economy was resented by professional sections of 
the Cuban bourgeoisie.(41) Batista did not even have the unconditional 
support of his generals. In the days before Castro took power, his 
senior officers were negotiating with Castro to save themselves at 
Batista's expense.
Even had it remained loyal, Batista's army could not have kept him 
in power. The upper echelons of his officer corps, including Tabernilla, 
was staffed by his friends and relatives, rather than by able officers. 
This had the further effect of alienating the very soldiers who might 
have been able to save Batista. The peasant soldiers were abominably 
paid and had no wish to stand and fight. They often retreated even 
before contacting the rebels.(42) To make matters worse, Cuba's army 
had virtually no military experience. The withdrawal of U.S. support 
damaged army morale even further.(43)
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CONCLUSIONS
Cuba resists inclusion in any revolutionary model. Guevara stated 
there were factors exceptional about the Cuban revolution but that 
it constituted a model which Latin America could follow. It does, 
however, make sense to talk about the revolution as a Cuban experience. 
It is interesting to note that in countries where Castro has encouraged 
revolution, such as Nicaragua, he has done so along the lines most 
suited to that individual nation.
How germane then is the Cuban experience to that presented in the 
previous chapter? The Cuban revolution is not a precise example 
of my theory in practice. There was neither deep-seated economic 
discontent nor serious ideological content. However, while not 
strong, these preconditions were present. What is important to 
note is that my theory states some preconditions are stronger than 
others. The weighting of these conditions depends on the particular 
nation. It would have taken a very sensitive analysis of Batista's 
Cuba to predict the revolution. When you bring together the strength 
of the political discontent, the force of Castro's personality, 
and the real, not apparent weakness of the Batista regime, it would 
be possible to foresee the revolution. The first step is to appraise 
realistically the preconditions and the precipitants. The next 
step is to recognize the differing strengths of these factors, not 
to attribute false strengths and weaknesses. The last step is to 
see whether the case study fits, by a careful balancing of the first 
two steps. It would, therefore, have been possible to predict the 
Cuban revolution, but extremely difficult.
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In 1972 Iran became part of the "Nixon Doctrine." The object of 
this policy, following the recent debacle in Vietnam, was to use 
key sympathetic nations to further U.S. interests without deploying 
American troops. President Nixon believed Iran sufficiently strong 
and stable to play such a role. While Presidents came and went, 
this doctrine remained. The unrest in Tehran during 1978 came as 
a surprise to many.(1) Though events are only inevitable through 
handsight, the causes of the disturbance on September 8, 1978(1), 
can be traced through Iranian history.(2) Any student of violent 
unrest needs to decide when relevant causes begin. If he chooses 
a date that is too early, he is likely to focus on many irrelevant 
factors. If the date he chooses is too late, he is likely to overlook 
many important causes. In the context of this analysis, I will 
be looking at Iran from 1963 to 1979. I am aware that 1906(3) and 
1953(4), could be selected as suitable starting dates, Any dates 
must be arbitrary; however, I believe that the dates on which I 
have decided proved a comprehensive historical background, whilst 
focusing on those events which were directly relevant to the revolution.
From 1962 to 1979, a number of problems beset the seemingly peaceful 
Iranian state. This chapter emphasizes three of these: the conflict 
between a modernizing state and the Islamic culture; the political 
expectations of the middle class; and the economic inadequacies 
of the regime.
The objective of this chapter is to determine the relevance of the 
Iranian Revolution to my theory. In pursuing this goal, I will
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look at whether the Iranian revolution was inevitable. I want to 
determine if the difficulties involved in bringing about a peaceful 
transition from a backward state to a modern industrialized nation 
could have been overcome. Was the revolution a product of these 
tensions or did it come about through the shah's incompetent handling 
of the 1978 crisis?
Before proceeding, we must establish whether there was revolutionary 
movement in Iran. In answering this question, I am taking no account 
of what happended after Ayatollah Khomeini(5) came to power. I 
am reviewing the movement that forced the shah to leave Iran in 
1979. There can be little doubt that a large number of people wanted 
a radical change in how Iran was being governed. The demonstrations, 
stikes and other protests, indicate the number of people involved.(6)
In contemplating the change desired by the movement we must examine 
its leadership. As with most large organizations, the movement 
which sought the overthrow of the shah was a coalition of many 
smaller groups. The movement consisted of religious fanatics, students, 
politicians, professionals and guerillas. They shared a desire 
to see the end of the shah's political control.(7) These leaders 
could not agree on the type of society they wanted; they could only 
agree on the society they did not want and they were well supported 
by the discontented masses.
PRECONDITIONS
Was there sufficient economic discontent to spark a revolution in 
Iran? There are three angles from which to approach this question.
To begin with, I will consider the economic discontent in the 
countryside, the shah's agrarian reform and the effects of this 
discontent on the revolution. Next, I will examine the economic 
weaknesses of the regime itself.
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What were conditions like in the countryside? How did the shah's 
government deal with the situation? What did all this have to do 
with the revolution? One of the chief problems in Iran was the 
lack of arable land. Only 5%, 8 million hectacres(8), were cultivated 
on a regular basis. Before the "White Revolution", the basic unit 
of land ownership was the village. A group of 400-(9) 450 families 
owned more that 60% of this land, with the result that only 5% of 
the peasants owned the land on which they worked.
Various means of sharecropping were used to extract the product 
from the land. The most common of these was to divide the crop into 
five inputs-land, labour, water, animals and seed.
Landowners automatically received 20% of the product, the few animal 
owners share 20%; the workers with a share in the product divide 20% 
among themselves; and the landless labourers worked for whatever 
the landowners would pay them. This resulted in a village hierarchy 
of landowners, animal owners, those entitled to the traditional 
labour share, and casual workers.(11)
The shah launched his program in January 1962 under the slogan of 
"land to the tiller". There were three stages to his plan. Under 
the first, the government undertook the redistribution of land from 
landowners to peasants, with restrictions on the amount of land 
that any one owner could hold. This stage reached 30% of Iranian 
villages and had the effect of giving the land to the relatively 
well-to-do peasants. The second stage started in 1965, and covered 
land not already affected by the first stage. Landowners were now 
given five ways in which to transfer land to the peasants; the principle 
one being to lease the land. This was intended to reach more than 
80% of the peasants. The third phase, designed to increase agricult­
ural production, encouraged the recipient peasants to participate 
in the state run agri-corporations.
Major economic consequences came from this prgrame of land reform,
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even though those who had nothing before it began continued to have 
nothing as a consequence. A new class, the wealthy bourgeoisie, 
was created. Many landowners sold land and moved into the cities 
to invest their money in industry. Many of these
new agri-corporations did nothing to increase food production and, 
by forcing the peasants off the land, caused increased unemployment. 
Through these measures the shah was also able to increase his control 
over the countryside.(12)
There is very little evidence of agrarian unrest in Iran, and that 
which there was tended to be sporadic. Whatever the conditions 
of the peasants before or after the revolution, it was the cities 
from which the shah faced a threat and not from the countryside.
In this respect, it is the third phase of the agrarian reform, that
is important. First, the unemployment caused by agri-business spurred
migration into already swollen cities. Second, this stage failed
to produce enough food for the rapidly expanding economy. The import­
ation of food led to ever-spiraling prices: Prices rose 250% between
1969-1978.(13)
Iran's sustained growth rate was remarkable. The gross national
product rose by 8% per annum in the 1960's, by 30.3% in 1973-1974,
and by 42% in 1974-1975. The GNP grew from $17.3 billion in 1972 
to $54.6 billion in 1978. The per capita GNP rose from around $500
in 1972 to $2400 in 1978.(14)
There was economic unrest in urban Iran, not because of absolute 
deprivation, but because people failed to obtain the goods they 
expected. Only certain groups in society gained from Iran's economic 
growth. It was mainly those in heavy industry who prospered. The 
many who did not had to put up with serious over crowding as Tehran's 
population rose from 2.5million in 1970 to 5 million in 1977, with 
rents soaring as high as 70% of income and high inflation rates.
While the people's living standards were not rising, their expectations
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were: the new marble-fronted appartment buildings: the 900,000
cars in the city with no public transport system; and the expensive 
western goods in the shops, enable people in northern Tehran to 
see how the rich were prospering from Iran's oil wealth.(15) The 
shah's claims that that within 10 years Iran would be one of the 
five wealthiest nations in the world, and his limited socio-economic 
reforms of April 1975 gave the working class hope their expectations 
could be fulfilled.(16)
In 1975 Iran's exports fell by 10%. Even though oil sales abroad
were to recover in 1976-77, this did nothing to boost the confidence
of the Iranian business community. As Eric Rouleau said, "This 
had not dissipated the disenchantment noticable in Iran’s business 
community, a disenchantment matching the expectations born of the 
1974 boom".(17) For Iran to develop economically, it had to use 
its oil revenues to promote economic diversification. The reverse 
was happening; Iran's non-oil exports declined from 22% of imports 
in 1959 to 5% of imports in 1978.
I would now like to look at the difficulties faced by the Iranian
State. Even with its huge oil wealth, to begin with, American reports 
put the waste factor in Iranian industry as high as 40% for a number 
of reasons: the emphas s on artisanal labour with lack of large
firms; the inefficiency in even large Iranian corporations; the 
relatively high cost of labour; and the high tariffs that diminished 
the need to compete.(18) Another economic problem in Iran was the 
degree of military spending. Under the 1973-1975 5-year plan, Iran 
spent an estimated 31% of its revenue on defense.(19) Iran's 
infrastructure was sadly lacking; there were simply not the resources 
to transport imported goods. The long lines at the Iranian-Soviet 
border and the rotting cargoes at the port of Khorramshar were public 
signs of this problem. Not only did the military absorb 31% of 
the government budget, but it also worked against private enterprise 
in the taking of other valuable resources such as skilled manpower.
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The high level of government spending, financed by oil revenues, 
increased domestic demand and sent prices rising.
The shah's attempt to use Iran's oil wealth to "modernize" his nation 
was unsuccessful. He failed to increase agricultural production, 
with the result that 1977 Iran was net importer of $2,500 million 
in food (10% of its income)(20) In addition, non-oil production 
stagnated. Some of this wealth was skimmed off by the shah's family, 
or went to compensate the middle classes for their lack of political 
power. As long as the shah had sufficient economic wealth to make 
his promises credible, he stood a chance of keeping the bourgeoisie's 
loyalty. Few powerful political appointments went to the bourgeoisie, 
so as soon as they felt economically threatened, they begun to with 
draw their support.(21) The reforms passed by the shah in April 1975 
led many in the business community to conclude that the shah had 
deserted them. Rouleau quoted one prominent businessman as saying 
"the shah's revolution is no longer a white revolution, it is a 
pink one".(22)
The Iranian political system was highly centralized. Until 1975 
the Majlis, or lower house, consisted of two parties, the Iran Novin 
and the Mardom. The Iran Novin Party served as the loyal opposition.
In 1975 these two parties merged into one - the National Resurgence 
Party. The shah banned all other political parties and encouraged 
all Iranians to join the new organization.
Political activity was to be channeled through either the right 
or left-wing of this one party. Those who wanted to remain politically 
active either had to join the Party or "face the consequences".
From 1963-1977, the shah successfully managed this system through 
economic incentives and repression. His main instrument in this 
repression was his State security organization, SAVAK. However, 
there was no way the shah could stop the rising economic social 
and political expectations of certain groups. He could control
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them for a while, but he could not prevent them. In 1977 Iran's 
oil revenues reached a plateau.(24) The shah refused to reduce 
his military spending, which limited his room for maneuver. In 
response to foreign pressure, especially President Carter's human 
rights policy, the shah was forced to relax his political stanglehold. 
It was at this time that political tension burst into the open.
The political opposition was divided into two sections - secular 
and clerical. The secular oppostion consisted of two main parties 
- the Liberation movement of Iran and the National Front. The 
National Front, revived in 1977, was the successor to the National 
Front of Mossadeq's time. This Tehran-based party advocated major 
political reforms, largely grounded in the 1906 constitution.
It's leaders organized and addressed many large rallies and, while 
it had a good deal of sympathy with the clergy, it was purely secular. 
There was to be much friction between the National Front and the 
clergy after the revolution. The other secular party, the Liberation 
Movement of Iran, favoured more intimate links with the clergy.
This party made good use of the Mosque network, and its leader,
Mehdi Bazergan, became Khomeini's first prime minister. Their position 
was one which fused nationalism to Islam. While Bazergan was to 
resign as prime minister in response to the taking of the American 
hostages in 1979, close links remained between this party and the 
clergy.
Politically, the clergy was important for three reasons: their alliance 
with the Bazeris brought huge crowds to the streets in 1978; they 
gave the revolutionary movement its ideology; and, most important 
of all, they provided the opposition with an alternative communications 
network. Speeches and messages were transfered from one town to 
another without using established media channels.
An in-depth study of human rights violations in Iran is beyond the
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scope of this paper. What needs to be considered is how this 
repression had a bearing on the political system. Amnesty Inter­
national stated: "The total number of political prisoners has
been reported at times throughout the year (1975) to be anything 
from 25,000 to 100,000".(25) The treatment of these prisoners 
has been well documented, and is not only an indictment of the shah's 
regime, but also the whole western world whose economic interests 
in Iran overshadowed any morale obligations.
What effect did SAVAK have on the Iranian people? Even though the 
shah claimed that the SAVAK had only 4,000 members, its policies 
were meant to make the people feel that they were always being watched.
(26) This led to distrust. A source cited by Marvin Rois expressed 
this feeling:
The people.... are distrustful. If you want the truth 
the people have lost confidence in everybody and 
everything. This distrust begins with the people 
themselves. People are no longer sure of their 
own ideas, beliefs, attitudes, or even their decisions.
This distrust in oneself, gained through actual experience, 
extends naturally to other too. They no longer trust 
everyone. They have heard so many lies, have seen so much 
creeping and crawling... whom can they trust? The 
people don't even trust the "people"(27)
The above passage is very important. This distrust led to a distrust 
of anything political. When the shah's political control mechanism 
began to fail, there was no way he could recapture support form 
a disbelieving population, many of whom bore the scars of SAVAK 
brutality.
The shah tried to modernize his nation, while maintaining complete 
political control. This was not possible. By depriving all others 
of any important part in the political decision-making process, 
he alienated himself from the population. He came to power through 
the armed forces and, by failing to establish his governments legitmacy, 
increasingly relied on wealth and repression to keep that power.
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What role did ideology play in the Iranian revolution? Fred Haliday 
would say it is wrong to think of what happened in Iran as an Islamic 
revolution,(28) his rationale being that it took a united front 
to overthrow the shah. This is true. It is also true that there 
is a chance the shah might have averted the revolution if he could 
have reached a compromise with the more moderate members of the middle 
class and clergy. In this way, he might have isolated the more 
radical members of the clergy. However, we must not underestimate 
the role of Islam in this more limited context.
The shah and his father, Reza Khan, had undertaken a policy of weaken­
ing the clergy's social and political standing. The clergy's 
influence over education and law, two fields in which they were 
traditionally very strong, had been considerably diminished by 
legislation passed in the 1950's and 1960's. At the same time the 
clergy lost their religious endowment lands, which embraced 2% of 
all land before the shah's "White Revolution", the shah also 
perpetrated attacks on the major theological colleges such as Gom, 
in 1963 and 1975.
More than 80% of Iranians are Shia Muslims. There are different 
schools of thought. These can basically be divided into fundamentalists, 
led by Khomeini, and reformists, led by Shariati until his death.
The reformists Islamic theory appeals to students and intellectuals, 
and is an attempt to bring Islam into line with modern world.
The Islamic teachings of Khomeini are much more traditional. He
sees himself as a defender of the faith, and uses emotional language
and images to mobilize his followers. He exploits messianic yearnings
and while never claiming to be returning Iman, he does nothing to
dispel such sentiments. His opposition to the shah concentrated
on three points, primarily, the shah's autocratic rule. Khomeini 
believes he himself alone can rule autocratically because he is
acting in the name of Allah. The shah was acting against the will
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of God. This was also a good point to unite the opposition factions, 
as it appealed to the middle class. Second, Khomeini opposed the 
shah's close links to the United States. Third, he did not like 
the relaxation of morals which had occured during the shah's reign.
The 1960's and 1970's were decades of great social change in Iran.
When people are confronted by such change, they often fall back 
on traditional values. This is not mere speculation. A brief look 
at the tremendous upsurge in religious activity in this period will 
confirm this. In 1976 there were 48 publishers of religious books 
in Tehran alone. Twenty-five of these sprang up in the 1965-75 
period.(29) In 1976-77 3.5 million people visited the holy shrines 
of Moshad, whilst ten years before they had only been 332,000.
There are four ways in which Shia Islam was of importance to the 
revolution: To begin with, it furnished the opposition movement with 
a set of values. Next, it provided a moral banner behind which 
the opposition could form. Furthermore, it gave the movement an 
organization which was based outside of the state of apparatus, 
and beyond the direct control of the shah. Finally, it gave the 
movement a charismatic leader.
PRECIPITANTS
The first of my precipitants is that of leaderhsip. An alliance 
of various groups formed the opposition. Each of these groups had 
leaders, some more important than others, nevertheless it is important 
to understand Ayatollah Khomeini was not the only leader. The 
religious leaders did play a critical role in the revolution. It 
was their emotional appeal, as well as their moral "strength" that 
persuaded many to come into the streets in opposition to the shah.
The great moral fervor they employed, and their reluctance to negotiate 
with secular authorities, could not have been stimulated by a purely 
secular movement.
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Khomeini was not the automatic choice for a religious leader. There 
were other important ayatollahs, such as Shariatmadei and Taleqai, 
who were religiously and socially very strong. Two main reasons 
explain why Khomeini came to the position he did. First, his move 
from Najaf in Iraq, where he had been since 1965, to Neuple-Chateau 
near Paris, in October 1978 gave him better access to the media 
than he had enjoyed in Iraq, enabling him to construct a well-crafted 
campaign that put him at the forefront of the revolution. Second, 
Khomeini refused to negotiate with the shah or his ministers. If, 
at a suitable time, the shah had been able to negotiate with the 
moderate opposition leaders he could perhaps have isolated, and 
defeated Khomeini. The shah did not initiate good faith negotiations, 
but rather responded to violence by making concessions. When it 
became clear that no compromise could be reached, battle lines 
were drawn. It was only natural that Khomeini, who had never damaged 
his reputation by talking to the shah would become leader of the 
opposition faction.
The reaction of the regime to popular unrest is critical to any 
understanding of the revolution. I would like to separate this 
question into two sections. Briefly, I would like to discuss the 
shah's reaction to opposition before 1977, then, in a little more 
detail, consider his response to the unrest of 1977-78.
There was very little manifest unrest between 1963 and 1977.(30)
What little there was, such as activity by the Mojahidin, student 
unrest, or industrial strikes, was brutally suppressed. There was 
no viable threat to the shah's authority, and he felt that there 
could be no compromise. He felt that he needed to exercise complete 
control in order to fulfill his mission and westernize Iran.
In 1977, things changed. It is important to note there was no cohesive 
policy on how to deal with this change. There are a couple of points 
that are often neglected and are relevant to our discussion. In 
the first place, the shah had recently lost many of his old friends
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and key advisors. Examples of those lost are court minister Asadollah 
Alam and former prime minister Manuchehr Eqbal. The shah's health 
was also important. First diagnosed in 1974, the lymphoratas cancer 
and the treatments used to contain this condition must have reduced 
the shah's ability to deal with the trying conditions of 1978.
The liberalization policy of the shah was a question of "too little, 
too late". This policy, forced on him by worsening domestic conditions 
and pressure from the United States, enabled the opposition to organise 
effectively. March 1978 saw a number of demonstrations in which 
all opposition groups particpated.
The shah made more extensive concessions in response to strikes and 
demands. These included Islamic reforms, freedom of the press, and the 
promise of free elections. These evoked no response, and on September,
8 the shah imposed martial law. The opposition continued to test 
the shah and, on that same day, the massacre at Jaleh Square seemed 
to dissolve any hope for peaceful settlement. These concessions 
by the shah not only failed to appease the opposition, they also 
shook the confidence of those who supported the monarch. His supporters 
began to wonder how strong the shah's commitment to them really 
was.(31) In November the shah put the country under martial law, 
and the stage was set for the flight of the shah on January 17, 1979.
On February, 11 the revolution had begun.
We must view the events of 1978 in the context of the rest of the 
shah's rule. Cpntralizing control through a policy of cultivating 
distrust led to his not being able to consolidate support in 1978.
The question here is whether the tensions in Iran could be diffused, 
or whether revolution was inevitable. There are, I feel, two options 
the shah had if he was to diffuse this discontent, at least in the 
short term: to give up political power, or to use physical force 
to crush the unrest at whatever cost.
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The shah did not want to relinquish his political power, He never 
initiated discussions on power sharing. By the time he instituted 
important reforms late in 1978 it was too late. Even if the opposition 
leader had believed his promises, they had no reason to compromise 
because they now expected to take full power. The only other alterna­
tive open to the shah was to employ full military force to crush 
to rebellion. This was basically the tactic used in 1963. The 
reason the shah was unwilling to adopt this option was an uncertainty 
at the Amercian response. Another explanation was that his whole 
country was solidly against him and his army was beginning to disinter- 
grate under the pressure of competing loyalties.(32) There is of 
course no guarantee that either of these options would have been 
successful. Indeed, by January 1979 they had ceased to exist. His 
erratic policy of limited liberalization and outright repression 
did nothing to appease the opposition, it merely frightened those 
who would have supported him.
Central to my thesis is the idea that no regime will fall unless 
it is physically weaker than the opposition. There are two steps 
to this process. First, the government, stripped of any power base 
in society, relies increasingly on the military. Second, this military 
force becomes effectively weaker than those forces opposing it.
The shah centralized authority to such a degree that there was no 
group in society with its own political power base.(33) His policy 
of "divide and rule" meant that there was nobody for him to turn 
to for support. He depended entirely on the military to remain 
in power. The shah claimed his legitimacy came from 2,500 years 
of imperial rule. This was not a valid point. The shah had no 
intentions of devolving power to an elected parliament and made 
no attempt to legitimize his rule. He was isolated from the rest 
of society.
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The shah spent the whole of his rule building up the armed forces.
His senior officers were fiercely loyal to him. Why then, could 
they not keep him in power? There are three explanations for the 
collapse of the military. To begin with, the abdication of the 
shah and the arrival of the American General Huyser caused confusion 
among the officer corps. They did not know whether Huyser had come 
to support Baktiar's government, or whether he was in Iran to negotiate 
a peaceful handing over of power to Khomeini. Furthermore, the 
army had no roots in society but was an isolated pillar of support 
for the shah. Also, despite it's massive arms procurement, the 
Iranian army had never fought a serious war. Finally, the senior 
officers were not prepared to launch a full-scale counter offensive.
With the shah gone and the Americans negotiating with Khomeini, 
the officers were in no position to take effective measures. Militarily 
the army could have held Tehran. In the light of political circum­
stances the military was not prepared to inflict heavy casualties 
on the civilian population.(34)
The job of the shah was not an easy one. In Chapter 2, I said revolutions
tend to happen during the country's modernizing stage. In Iran
this stage was particularly awkward. The shah wanted to convert
Iran from a traditional Islamic state into a modern western state
in a brief period. What he failed to understand was that for a
country to be socially and economically developed, it also has to
be politically developed. He needed to create political safety
valves so that the rising middle class would support, not oppose
him.
The shah failed. Economically, he failed both to increase agricultural 
and industrial output. Socially, he failed to do much for illiteracy 
or health care.(35) Politically, he gave the middle classes no 
room for expression, so they took hold of the opportunity to join 
with the clerics in ousting the shah. The shah tried to modernize 
Iran without giving it the tools to do the jobs. For him to be
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successful, it would have taken more talent or luck than the shah 
possessed.
There are many differences between Cuba and Iran. Yet my theory 
indicates that, despite their differences, they can be grouped togther. 
The preconditions of economic and political discontent and ideology 
were present. They were acted on by the precipitants of leadership, 
inefficient reaction by the regime and an ultimate weakness of physical 
repressive capabilties. The result was revolution.
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 4
(1) I am refering to the riots at Jaleh Square
(2) The author is aware that the state of Iran is a modern entity.
For the sake of an historical perspective I am equating 
contemporary Iran with Persia.
(3) 1906 was the date of the Iranian Constitution. This document 
was often quoted by secular opposition movements.
(4) The date the shah took power
(5) This is to defuse the argument that there was no revolution
in Iran on the grounds that Khomeini's rule was autocratic 
as the Shah's.
(6) Amin Saikal, The Rise and Fall of the Shah, Princeton, 1980 
p193-195
(7) Some of the opposition groups did not, at first, require the 
shah to leave
(8) Fred Haliday, Iran: Dictatorhsip and Development, London 1979
p106
(9) The so called "White Revolution" was a reform package, under
a constitutional monarch, meant to appeal to both conservative 
(White) and radical (Revolution) elements. See Saikal, p79
(10) Haliday, p106
(11) The landowners often received the water share in addition 
to their 20?o land share.
(12) Those who prospered were often the animal owners.
(13) For urbanization, and inflation rates, see Table 2 in the 
Appendix following this chapter. There are very few unemloyment 
figures for Iran and those that there are tend to count seasonal 
workers as being employed.
(14) Haliday, p138
(15) E. Rouleau, Iran: The Myth and Reality, the Guardian Weekly, 
October, 24, 1976. (This article was published in two parts, 
the concluding half appearing in the same paper on October,
31, 1976)
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(16) The April 1975 reforms included giving 4?o of the shares in 320 
firms to the workers, and 99?o in state run firms. Rouleay, 
October, 31, p12





(22) Rouleau, October, 31, p12
(23) Although there was no direct pressure on people to join the
party, all government personnel had to join and anybody who
did not was seen as being anti-shah. See John Stempel, Inside
the Iranian Revolution, 1981, p35 Saikal, 9189
(24) Iran's oil revenue fell from 20,000m dollars in 1976 to 17,000m 
in 1978. Haliday, p143
(25) Reza Baraheni, The Crowned Canibals: Writing on Repression 
in Iran, New York, 1977, p7
(26) There is considerable debate as to the correct number of SAVAK 
agents. Both Reza Baraheni and William Butler, chairman of 
the Internation Commission of Jurists Executive Commission, 
put the figure around 200,000. Saikal, p190
(27) Saikal, p19Q
(28) Haliday, p134
(29) Said Amir Arjomand, Shi'ite Islam and the Revolution, Government 
and Opposition, vol 16, no 3 (Summer 1981), p311
(30) The army was not once used during this period to restore order, 
Haliday, p51
(31) Rouleau quotes two prominent ijdustrialists, Habib Elchanin 
and Habib Sabet, as being disallusioned with the Shah. His 
anti-corruption drive, during which he jailed 8,000 businessman 
did nothing to bolster confidence within the business community.
(32) A military coup in Iran was always an option, however, the 
potential cost in human lives and the split in the officer 
corps made it more and more remote as time went by.
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(33) The Shah made all the important decisions, and political 
power stemmed from him, see Stempel, p18
(34) Besides, a largely rural conscript army could not be relied 




It is difficult to decide on relevant causes for the Nicaraguan 
revolution. The presence of U.S. troops in the country from 1909 
to 1933, the assasination of General Augusto Cesar Sandino in 1934, 
and the rise to the presidency of Anastiasio Somoza Garcia in 1936 
are all relevant to the Nicaraguan revolution of 1979. This chapter 
will indicate the importance of these events while concentrating 
on events that occured in the 1970's, such as the Managuan earthquake 
and the assasination of Pedro Joaquin Chamorro. These events are 
extremely important and must be seen as directly relevant to the 
Nicaraguan revolution rather than symptoms of the revolutionary 
process.
The first problem we have to deal with is whether there was a 
revolutionary movement in Nicaragua. There was no single, rigidly 
organized, revolutionary group, enjoying mass support which sought 
to overthrow Somoza.(1) Does this refute my theory? I believe 
not. As with the revolutions in Cuba and Iran, there were many 
groups which sought to overthrow Somoza. There were also many people 
in Nicaragua who, without belonging to any formal organization, 
were looking for an opportunity to voice their discontent with the 
Somoza regime. As Richard Fagen points out;
Fed up with more than four decades of tyrannical and brutal 
rule, the citizenry had revolted. Inspired, but not necessarily 
directly led by the Sandinistas, thousands of young men 
and women had taken up whatever arms were at hand. Hundreds 
of thousands of other nicaraguans helped in what way they could: 
by closing their shops and by sheltering and supplying the 
multitude of muchachos heroicos or simply by passing information 




Examples of the hatred felt against Somoza were the 120,000 people 
who paraded at the funeral of Chammorro and the almost pregnant 
general strike of January 1978.(3)
There is no doubt there was a movement seeking to overthrow Somoza.
This on its own is not enough to label those people as revolutionary.
We need to look for evidence of radical policies. The five-person 
Government of National Reconstruction (JGRN), which succeeded Somoza, 
could^ not be considered extremist. A majority of this group, consisting 
of two conservatives (Violetta Chammorro and Alfonso Robello), two 
social democrats (Sergio Ramierex and Daniel Ortega), and one leftist 
(Moises Hassan), favored moderate policies which committed the new 
government to a pluralist society guaranteeing private property.
The reason for this stance is clear: The Sandinistas realized that,
given the shattered state of the Nicaraguan economy, they had to 
encourage private enterprise and foreign investment. The best way 
for them to do this was to present a moderate front. While the 
real strength lay with the Sandinista Nation Liberation Front (FSLN), 
the bourgeoisie had been important in the earlier stages of the 
revolution, and the Sandinistas wanted to weaken gradually the 
bourgeois position yet keep and international image of internal 
unity. The real political power rested not with the JGRN, but with 
the nine-man Sandinist National Directorate (DNC), whose member 
were more extreme than those of the provisional government(4).
Though there had always been guerillas dedicated to overthrowing 
Somoza, it was not until 1974-77 that this became a mass movement.
This movement became revolutionary, when it's leadership was transferred 
to the F.S.L.N. When this happened, the movement's political goals 
crystalized and became more radical.(3)
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PRECONDITIONS
With an area of some 57,143 square miles, Nicaragua is a little 
larger than the state of Wisconsin.(6) In 1970, 47% of it's 2 million 
people worked in agriculture.(7) It's main crops are coffee and 
cotton, although sugar is also important. Nicaragua underwent 
modernization accomplished throught light industrialization and 
import substitution. Between 1960 and 1970 manufacturing grew at 
an annual rate of 10.5%; investment increased in both private and 
public sectors (from 4.4% and 10.2% of GDP respectively in 1960 
to 6.6% and 13.2% in 1970); and the Nicaraguan GDP rose at an annual 
rate of 6.9%.(8)
Despite this industrialization, Nicaragua was still predominantly 
a producer of primary products. By the 1969's and 1970's the terms 
of trade were distinctly unfavourable to coffee and cotton. The 
1974-75 recession hit Nicaragua, along with the other primary producers, 
extremely hard.(9) The increase in light industry led to an influx 
of equipment resulting in the rise of capital imports from 18.5% 
of total imports in 1960 to 21.2% in 1976. The import of intermediary 
products also resulted in worsening terms of trade, and the techniquues 
led to an increase in rural unemployment, resulting in a migration 
of peasants into alredy overcrowded towns.(10)
What were conditions like in the Nicaraguan countryside and what 
effect did this have on the revolution? In 1975, 78.2% of Nicaraguans 
owned 17.4% of the land. (11) Those peasants who owned small plots 
of land engaged in subsistence farming, growing corn, beans and 
rice. During the harvest months, November to February, they would 
join with the landless labourers in working the coffee and cotton 
harvests. This resulted in many people being able to work for only 
four months to support their families for the entire year. The 
illiteracy rate in pre-revolutionary Nicaragua was around 70%, with 
the rates in the countryside hovering around 90%. Only 16.1% of
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the houses had potable water and scarcely 8% boasted sewerage 
facilities. The infant mortality rate was one of the highest in 
Latin America, standing at some 102 deaths out of 1,000 live births.
(12)
Conditions in rural areas were, by any standard extremely poor.
No doubt many peasants provided at least tacit support for the 
Sandinastas. However, Somoza's problems did not stem from this 
area. It was urban unrest which was to start the 18-month civil 
war that brought down his government.(13)
There are two forms of discontent in the towns: bourgeois and 
proletarian. Somoza treated the urban working class paternalistically, 
granting workers a social security system and an annual bonus of 
one months pay. This was not enough to compensate for high unemployment 
rates and poor working conditions. Members of the working class 
were extremely conscious of the wealth enjoyed by Somoza and his 
entourage. Much of this came from the relief funds meant to benefit 
the disaster victims. The scraps that Somoza threw to the working 
class did nothing to soften the blow of rising inflation (the annual 
inflation rate rose from 1.7% before 1970 to 11% in 1977), and brutal 
National Guard repression.(14)
The bourgeoisie had allied itself closely with the Somoza dynasty.
In return for being politically quiet, they had been given a stable 
environment in which to accumulate considerable wealth. After the 
1972 Managua earthquake, things changed. Somoza appropriated relief 
funds for himself, alienating members of the middle class and scaring 
away foreign investment.(15)
By 1978 there were grave economic problems. These were further 
aggravated by 18 months of civil war. It is estimated that 50,000 
people were killed and a further 100,000 wounded. Direct damage 
to infrasturcture was around $480million. There was also capital 
flight of approximately $1.5 billion. Hundreds of millions of dollars
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worth of crops were either not planted or destroyed. The damage was 
so bad that by the end of 1981, real per capita income was 25% less 
than it was before the war started.(16)
For the initial political unrest in Nicaragua, we must look to the 
bourgeoisie. Whatever the position of the FSLN in the coalition 
that finally overthrew Somoza, we must agree with Alfonso Robello 
when he argues that it was the middle class who started the revolution 
going: "We were the center of the opposition to Somoza: Without
us the Sandinistas would not have had their victories".(17)
Before 1972, the middles class was reasonable happy with the political 
power structure in Nicaragua.(18) As well as receiving economic 
privilages, they enjoyed a political role, albeit limited, through 
the opposition Conservative party. The last agreement between the 
Conservative party and the ruling National Liberal party allowed 
for a handing over of presidential power to a triumverate between 
1972-74.
The middle class was willing to go along with Somoza for as long 
as it was in their interests to do so. The bourgeoisie saw its 
interest threatened, with Somoza's reneging on the 1972 agreement, 
his handling of the earthquake relief operations, and his encroachment 
into fields of operation traditionally enjoyed by the middle class.
The moderate opposition grouped around the anti-Somoza editor of 
"La Prensa", Pedro Joaguin Chamorro. In 1974 Chamorro organized 
seven political parties, and two labor confederations into the 
Domestic Liberation Union (UDEL).
These politicians could hardly have been called revolutionary.
They tried to put pressure on the United States to persuade Somoza 
to give up most of his political power. This did not occur and 
proved one of the main reasons for the failure to reach a moderate 
settlement.
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The Broad Opposition Front (FAO), a centrist oroanization, was founded 
in May 1978 after the assassination of Chamorro. This was the last
chance to keep the movement to oust Somoza in moderate hands. The
bourgeois opposition lost the iniative during the crucial months 
of May-August 1978. They spent their time waiting for U.S. pressure 
to force Somoza from office, while the radical FSLN spent this time 
grabbing popular imangination with such actions a s the capture 
of the National Palace on August, 22, 1978.(19) The United States 
did not react to the pressure put on it by the Nicaraguan bourgeoisie 
and angered many moderates by sending a telegram to Somoza congratula­
ting him on his improved human rights records. With the tecerista 
faction of the FSLN willing to negotiate with the moderate factions, 
there was really no other path for the movement to take.(20)
What role did ideology play in this revolution? Although the FSLN
was to play an important part in leading the movement, the revolution 
was, to some degree, a spontanious uprising against Somoza, sparked 
by such incidents as the assassination of Chamorro. Bearing this 
in mind, there would seem to be very little part for ideology to 
play. It did not play the same role as Islam did in the Iranian 
revolution, but it was important. If we look at the leaders of 
the revolution, we can identify an ideology among them, and we 
can see what effect it had on their actions.
This ideology was a mixture of Marxism and Sandinism. What then 
is Sandinism? Taking its name from the guerilla leader Cesar Augusto 
Sandino, it is a mixture of Socialism and Nationalism. To quote 
Henry Weber:
With Sandino's guerilla activity, a new political force, 
hostile to both factions of the Nicaraguan oligarchy made 
its appearance on the historical arena in a form of 
petty-bourgeois nationalism, tinged with utopian socialist 
and spriritualist ideology.(21)
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Sandinism is as Carlos Fonseca Amador pointed out "a dinstinctly 
Nicaraguan experience, Socialist and National demands are combined 
in the Sandinist People's Revolution. We identify with Socialism 
whilst retaining a critical attitude to the socialist experience".(22)
I doubt whether ideology had the direct effect on Nicaraguans that 
it had on the Iranian people. It did have an effect on the FSLN 
leadership. It is interesting to see, how events in contemporary 
Nicaragua show this influence.
PRECIPITANTS
The FSLN did not instigate the huge demonstrations and the 90% general 
strike that shook the Somoza regime.(23) It was the moderate political 
opposition that started the protest and the FSLN merely endorsed 
it midway through. Within one year the FSLN seized control of the 
revolutionary movement that overthrew Somoza. The role of the FSLN 
is crucial to any study of the Nicaraguan revolution.
The FSLN was founded in 1962. It sprang up with many other guerilla 
groups following the success of Fidel Castro in Cuba. It was to 
hit the international headlines in 1974, when it conducted a raid 
on a society Christmas party in Managua, taking hostage 12 members 
of Somoza's inner circle. The FSLN was again quiet, following the 
National Guard's counter-insurgency program until 1977. As William 
Leo Grande points out, the FSLN was not a threat to the Somoza regime 
at the beginning of 1978.(24) The FSLN used the assassination of 
Chamorro to seize the leadership of the opposition movement. It 
was able to do this for three important reasons: First it caught 
the popular imagination with such actvities as the August raid on 
the National Palace. Second, it offered a radical alternative to 
the poor and did not compromise its position by giving ground to 
the United States. Third, and most important, it gave hope that 
Somoza could be overthrown. If Somoza were to go, the population
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knew he would have to be defeated militarily. The FSLN provided 
hope that this could be done, causing many to believe in the struggle 
against Somoza.(25)
Somoza himself played an important part in bringing about the revolu­
tion. He did this in four main ways: To begin with, his instigating
of the brutal National Guard repressions of 1974-77 and September 1978 
sowed seeds of revolution in an already disillusioned population.
Next, his relative relaxation of repression in 1977, following moves 
by President Carter, enabled the FSLN to resume military operations. 
Furthermore, his cover up of the murder of Chamorro did not reduce 
suspicions that he had been behind the assassination. Finally, his 
failure to take seriously negotiations which might have meant his 
stepping down from the presidency prevented any real chance of arriving 
at a peaceful settlement.
Between 1974 and 1977, the National Guard launched a counter-insurgency 
campaign. This campaign was aimed at the northern departments of 
Zelay, Matagalpa, and Segouva, where the FSLN had been the most 
active.(26) Sections of the population were uprooted and sent to 
resettlement camps. Somoza believed that his efforts had been 
successful, but they were not. Within his own country, it brought 
cries of indignation from such conservative groups as the Roman 
Catholic bishops, who were outraged at the "humiliating and inhuman 
treatment ranging from torture and rape to summary execution", 
perpetrated by the National Guard on fellow Nicaraguans.(27) 
Internationally, there was such an outcry that even the United States 
had to reduce military aid. The counter Insurgery campaign's main 
effect was on the Nicaraguan people themselves. This terror made 
it safer for many people to join the FSLN, than it was to stay 
in their own homes.(28) It also conditioned people to violence, 
and made them more dedicated to seeing the removal of Somoza. As 
one old man in Managua put it, "We've had weeks of bullets. Bullets
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for breakfast, bullets for lunch, bullets for dinner, and bullets 
before going to bed. But after they bomb you, bullets mean nothing".
(29)
Somoza did not follow Batista's lead and flee the country before 
his regime was really threatened, but stayed to put up a struggle.
Vet, if a revolution is to succeed, there must be a time when the 
revolution forces are stronger than the conservative ones. This 
usually takes place in two stages: the isolation of the regime
from any power base in society; and the weakening of the armed forces 
which are then keeping the regime in power.
Cuzan and Heggen made the point that the strength of any government 
depends on three things: its legitimacy, the scope of its operations, 
and its coercive strength.(30) Before 1972, Somoza enjoyed a fair 
degree of political support, this was to change following the Managua 
earthquake. At the same time, he was intent on increasing the scope 
of his government operations by 28%. Interestingly enough, he also 
reduced his coercive capabilities. (Between 1965-75 the number 
of National Guard soldiers per 1,000 of population fell by 40%).
The fighting capability of those remaining was open to question.
Somoza so feard a coup he rotated his officers incommand and 
encouraged widespread corruption so that guardsmen would owe their 
allegiance only to him. In concluding this section, I must agree 
with Cuzan and Heggan when they said
...had Somoza given away proportions of his wealth and 
power and adopted democratic proceudres, he could 
have acquired enough legitimacy to persuade the 
population to recognize the authority of his 
government and reject the appeals of the Marxist 
revolutionaries.(31)
The revolution in Nicaragua could have been avoided as late as 1978. 
The best chance of such a move seemed to be through U.S. pressure
Page 77
on Somoza to reach an agreement with the more moderate elements of 
the opposition. Nevertheless, it seemed that the United States 
was always one step behind what was really going on. As Richard 
Fagen points out, "History has also reaffirmed the seemingly infinite 
capacity for the U.S. government to misread and mismanage the 
situation".(32) When America first started negotiations with the 
oppositional bourgeoisie through the FAO in 1978, it wanted to keep 
Somoza in power. This was not possible and all these negotiations 
did was damage the credibility of the FAO. the United States then 
realized that Somoza had to resign. Having seemingly made a crucial 
step forward, they then wanted to keep the FSLN out of any Nicaraguan 
government at a time when the Sandinastas were leading the revoltuionary 
movement. When the FSLN was on the brink of military victory, the 
United States tried to put pressure on them to add two more moderates 
to the provisional government. There was no longer any room to 
negotiate.
Not all the blame for the handling of the Nicaraguan situation must 
be put on President Carter. Carter first had to deal with Somoza's 
stubborness. When given the choice between a dictator and a 
communist, the President did not have a lot of room for manouvers.
Yet even if Carter had seen the need to force Somoza to go, he still 
would have faced a strong pro-Somoza lobby on Capitol Hill. After 
the National Guards mopping up campaign of September 1978, U.S.
Reps Charles Wilson (D-Texas), and John Murphy (D-NY) were threatening 
to hold up legislation if Carter moved against Somoza.(33)
The preconditions for revolution existed in Nicaragua. What is 
very interesting to note in this respect is the way in which certain 
events acted as catalyst on this discontent, and how the FSLN was 
able to use the resultant unrest to take control of the opposition 
movement. My theory allows for the fact that not every factor will 
hold the same weight in every revolution. Ideology is a good example. 
Whilst I feel that the study of ideology is important for a full
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understanding of the Nicaraguan revolution, I don't think it was 
as important as it was in Iran.
I believe that no historical event is inevitable. All that one 
can do is say that given a certain set of factors, one of the possible 
outcomes of those factors could be a certain event. This works 
extremely well with the Nicaraguan revolution.
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 5
(1) There were many groups who sought Somoza's overthrow. These 
included; COSEP (The employers union), the Roman Catholic 
Church (Especially at the parish level), La Prensa (The nations 
largest selling newspaper), and the United Peoples movement
(a FSLN sponsored group). These groups formed a part of the 
opposition umbrella movements (such as UDEL and FAO), which 
are mentioned in this chapter.
(2) Richard R Fagen, The End of the Affair, Foreign Policy, no 36 
(Summer 1980), p178
(3) The general strike was called by COSEP (the employers union), 
on January 13, 1978. Henry Weber, Nicaragua: The Sandinist
Revolution, London 1981
(4) The nine men were made up from three factions of the FSLN,
the Protracted People's war tendency, the Proletarian tendancy, 
and the Terceristas. For a full discussion on how the DNC 
took power, please see Stephen M Gorman, Saninasta Chess:
How the Left Took Control, Carribean Review (Winter 1981) 
p14-17
(5) James Nelso Goodsell, Nicaragua: An Interim Assessment, 
Internation Journal, XXXVII (winter 1981-82) p95
(6) See Table 9
(7) Investment figures are taken from Weber p24
(8) In 1975 GDP fell to 2.2% (Which, when taken with the rise
in population means a fall in real terms).
(9) The percentage of Nicaraguans living in towns of over 20,000
people rose from 23.1 in 1960 to 31.0 in 1970
(10) Weber, p27
(11) Doris Tijerno, Inside the Nicaraguan Revolution, Vancouver
1981, pi 1
(12) Beginning with the January 13 general strike called by COSEP
(13) See Tijerino, especially p132, for an example of how long
workers agreements came to reach.
(14) Most authors seem to agree that Somoza made huge profits out
of the 1972 earthquake relief operations, angering all other
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sections of Nicaraguan society. William Leogrande, The Revolution 
in Nicaragua, Another Cuba?, Foreign Affairs, vol 58, no 1,
(Fall 1979), p31 Robin Naverro Montgomery, The fall of Somoza: 
Anatomy of a Revolution, Parameters: Journal of the U.S. Army 
War College, vol 10, no 1 (March 1980T^ p51 Fagen End of the 
Affair, p181
(15) Somoza was also encroaching on the traditional preserves of 
the bourgeoisie, Weber, p33. Thomas Walker, The Sandinist 
Victory in Nicaragua, Current History, vol 78, no 454,
(February 1980), p57-61
(16) Richard Fagen, The Nicaraguan Crisis, Review of the Month, 
vol 34 no 6, (November 1982), p4
(17) I take as evidence for this statement the fact that there
was very little anti-government unrest before 1972. Certainly 
nothing on the scale of that sponsored by the UDEL.
(18) The FSLN was made up of the following three factions: The
Proletation Tendency, the Protracted People's War Tendency 
and the Terceristas.
(19) The terceristas were the only faction of the FSLN who sought 





(24) Gottschalk, for the importance of hope to a revolutionary
(25) Fagen, End of the Affair, p186
(26) Leogrande, p31
(27) The indescriminate nature of the executions meant that it 
was often safer for people, especially young men, to follow 
the FSLN than it was to stay at home.
(28) Fagen, End of the Affair, p186
(29) Alfred G Cuzan and Richard J Heggen, A Macro-Political Explanation 
of the 1979 Nicaraguan Revolution, Latin American Research 
Review vol 17, no 2, (1982), p156-170. All figures in this 
paragraph are taken from Cuzan and Heggen.
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(30) Cuzan and Heggen, p166






First I would like to look at some of the discussion points raised 
by my examination of existing theoretical work. Second, how successful 
has my theory been in answering the questions raised by the the 
three case studies, and what throwbacks has this had on to the initial 
discussion? Third, I hope to provide some pointers for the direction 
of future research.
Revolution is a topic worthy of attracting research because of its 
widespread political, economic and social consequences. Modern 
research into revolution has provided very few conclusions. I believe 
the time has now come for us to use contemporary revolutions to 
test existing theories, rather than developing new theories to explain 
classical revolutions.(1) This contemporary work will enable us 
to fine tune our theories, or revert to discovering new ones, and 
will stop us from trying to force the factual foot into the theoretical 
shoe.
The modern student of politics knows too little about the causes 
of revolution to judge whether they can be studied in the same context 
as other forms of collective violence. It may be that an industrial 
stike can be analyzed in much the same way as revolution, but until 
we know more about the causes of revolutions it makes more sense 
to focus on the complex series of events which make up a revolution. 
This definition need not hold the political scientist up definitely 
as all that is required is a working definition which will help 
us to focus on the matter at hand.
If pre-1959 Cuban society had been flawless it would have been easy 
to identify the causes of the Cuban Revolution. However, there 
has never been, nor will there be, a perfect society. The social
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scientist must decide when levels of discontent within a country 
both absolute and perceived, are unacceptably high. He then needs 
to consider the government's response to this unrest and whether 
it is likely to result in revolution. It is easy to highlight discon­
tent with hindsight but not as easy to predict. It is the social 
scientist's duty to develop a theory capable of predicting revolution.
My definition states that there must be a mass movement seeking to 
bring radical economic, political and social change through violent 
means. In the Iranian, Nicaraguan and Cuban revolutions this movement 
was held together by a desire to see the end of the existing regime. 
The revolutionary leadership tended to be more radical than the mass 
membership. This conflict of interest caused tension after the 
revolution had succeeded, at which point it became extremely difficult 
to reconcile differences within the movement. Present day Iran and 
Nicaragua are good example of this tension.
There was then, in all three case studies, a mass movement seeking 
change by violent means. However, it was the revolutionary leadership 
that provided the ideology to focus the need for radical change.
Economic discontent was prevalent in pre-revolutionary Cuba, Iran 
and Nicaragua. The problem here is that nearly all countries suffer 
from discontent, in some shape or form, yet not all these experience 
revolution. We need to ask whether or not there were abnormally high 
levels of discontent in these societies, who suffered it, and what 
consequent effect did this deprivation have on the revolution. It 
is not enough to say that just because there was deprivation, the 
deprivation caused the revolution. We must be able to show the effect 
of deprivation on those people who perpetrated the revolution, if 
we are going to label economic deprivation as a revolutionary cause.
Page 84
By Latin American standards Cuba was prosperous nation.(2) However, 
there were two types of economic discontent in the country: "absolute", 
in the Sierra Maestra Mountains, and "perceived" in the major cities.
(3)
One of the poorest parts of Cuba was the mountaineous region of the 
Sierra Maestra. It was in these mountains that Castro was able 
to hide from Batista's Army and to finally establish his "Foco".(4)
While it is probably true that Guevarra and Castro have subsequently 
overemphasized the role of the peasant in the Cuban revolution, 
there can be little doubt that this role was a crucial one.j(5)
Many theorists have argued the importance of perceived deprivation.
It can be pointed to, but is extremely difficult to prove as we 
are dealing with people's feelings. What is interesting in the 
three case studies is that it was not the people who suffered absolute 
deprivation who sparked off the revolution. This is because it 
is not those who are starving who revolt, but those who, though 
agrieved, have hope for something better. Even Cuba, where the 
revolution was nurtured in the Sierra Maestra, it was caused by 
young intellectuals and not starving peasants.
It was among the revolutionary leadership that political discontent 
was acutely felt. They had political expectations which were not 
met due to intransigence, either real or perceived, on the part 
of the existing regime. The revolutionary leadership attempts to 
use the economic discontent as fuel to challenge the existing regime 
through mass violence. While the degree of political discontent 
differs; the concept holds true for all three case studies. In 
Cuba, Castro and his followers were enraged by the manner in which 
Batista seized power. They held this seizure to be illegitimate, 
and this resentment was the driving force behind the Cuban revolution. 
In Iran there was discontent focused on the way the Shah was trying 
to monopolize the political process. In Nicaragua the middle class
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was unhappy about Somoza's refusal to share his power, a scenario 
which came to a head with his reneging on the 1974 agreement. It 
was this middle-class discontent which was to spark off the revolution.
In Havana, the split between the rich and poor was particularly 
apparent. The wealth of the Americans and the Cuban upper classes 
/re especially resented by the graduates churned out of Havana 
University.
When combined with the political resentment felt by both students 
and political emigrees at Batista's illegal seizure of power, this 
perceived deprivation, goes a long way towards explaining the urban 
revolutionary faction that played a vital part in the Cuban revolutionary 
struggle.
The rapidly expanding city of Tehran was undoubtably the center 
of the Iranian revolution.(6) Perceived economic discontent was 
prevalent in a city which boasted 900,000 private cars but did not 
enjoy a public transport system. One half of the city shopped in 
modern western stores while the other half scraped by on the bare 
necessities.(7) The filtering through of the massive Iranian oil 
wealth went even further to fuel this discontent.
The percieved economic discontent in Iran was certainly felt by 
those who fought the revolution.
In Nicaragua there was both absolute and perceived deprivation. 
Predominantly a primary producer, Nicaragua suffered badly during 
the world recession of 1974-75. Urban Nicaragua also suffered from 
high unemployment and soaring inflation.(8) The final economic 
straw was to devestate the nations's infrasturcture. While his 
people suffered, Somoza's riches multiplied. His mismanagement 
of the Managua earthquake relief funds further incensed both the 
middle and working classes in Nicaragua.
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Ideology played a part in all three case studies. However, the 
importance of ideology as a revolutionary precondition varies greatly. 
In Cuba and Nicaragua the aim of the revolutionary movement was 
to over throw the existing regime and not to worry over what was 
to be put in it's place. The revolutionary leadership formulated 
an ideology which grew in significance as the revolution progressed, 
but only really became apparent to the mass membership after the 
revolution had been successful. In Iran, the ideology was one of 
the key revolutionary preconditions and was used to great effect 
by the revolutionary leadership. By trying to modernize Iran single- 
handed, the shah took influence away from the traditional power 
source; the clergy. In times of radical change people cling to 
traditional values. An upsurge in religious activity in the 1970's 
gave the self-styled defender of the faith, Khomeini, a base from 
which to launch his attack on the shah.
The role of leadership as a catalyst in provoking revolution is 
an interesting one. In all three case studies there was no automatic 
choice for revolutionary leader. In Iran, Cuba and Nicaragua there 
was a great deal of competition for the post. In each case the 
successful leaders acted to make themselves the only viable alternative 
to the existing regime. They also refused to be a party to any 
negotiations with the leaders they sought to overthrow, so when 
these talks failed, they were not discredited. Khomeini's position 
at the center of his international communications network, Castro's 
work and broadcasts and subsequent capture of the Santa Clara gun 
train and the Tercerista faction of FSLN's raid on the National 
Assembly, caught the people's attention and set these leaders up 
as viable alternatives to the existing regimes.
The next of my precipitants is that of the existing regimes reaction 
to the initial discontent. The preconditions for revolution can 
lie dormant in society for many years. (A discontent in the mountains 
of the Sierra Maestra, and the modernization of Iran were not overnight
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phenomena). The government's handling of initial problems is crucial 
to future events. Despite the record unemployment rates of the 
1930's the contemporary government were seen to be trying to alleviate 
the discontent. Perhaps even more important, the legitimate power 
structure was kept in place which allowed people to manifest their 
discontent through the ballot box.
In Iran, Nicaragua and Cuba, instead of helping its people, each 
government seemed to be repressing them through the use of indiscrim­
inate terror. This terror serves to make men join the revolutionary 
movement because they are just as likely to suffer reprisals whether 
or not they do so. Good examples of this terror can be seen in 
the work of SAVAK in Iran and the National Guard in Nicaragua.
With the National Guard's counterinsurgency campaign, it is said 
to have been safer to join the FSLN than to stay in the villages.
Tied in with this repression is the unavailability of the political 
process to those seeking redress. This combination leads to all 
those not actively aligned with the regime placing their allegiance 
elsewhere.
The question of how a government deals with economic discontent 
is not straightforward. There are times, such as Nicaragua, where 
the government is able to help those who are suffering but chooses 
not to. In other cases the government may be well aware of the 
problems but be unable to do much about them. Two good examples 
here would be the present day Angola and Sudan. In still other 
cases the government may perceive the problem and be trying to do 
something about it but their attempts are misguided and not appreciated 
by the suffering people. The shah of Iran was trying to bring his 
country into the twentieth century but all his people saw was an 
attempt to erode their traditional power structure.
My final precipitant is the effective military strength of the existing
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regime. I agree with Gottschalk when he said this strength is the 
key to whether or not a revolution will be successful. There are 
two stages to the disintigration of any regime: The withering away 
of any power base within society; and the inability to hold on to 
power through merely military means. The rest of this thesis has 
been devoted to describing the alienation program which the regime 
follows, this precipitant deals with how long they can hold on to 
power when they have become isolated from the society in which they 
govern.
When talking about military weakness it is easy to be tautological.
If we propose revolutions take place because of military weakness 
it is not enough to quote as our evidence examples of revolution 
which have taken place because the military was not strong enough 
to prevent them. To present a theory capable of predicting revolution 
we must be able to foresee military collapse. All three of our 
case studies show this to be extremely diffficult. In pre-revolutionary 
Cuba, Castro's army of 800 men was up against Batista's well equipped, 
modern fighting force. In both Iran and Nicaragua the revolutionary 
forces were faced by western-trained and equipped military machines. 
While it is easy to predict with hindsight, there were pointers 
to the regime's military weakness which were available before the 
revolution was successful. All three of the armies were isolated 
from their societies, because it was a common policy for soldiers 
to serve away from homelands. None of the armies had a great deal 
of experience under battle conditions, the weapons supplied by 
the United States were highly technical and required a certain 
expertise not available in these armies. These weapons were also 
often not applicable to the type of fighting that needed to be done. 
Senior officers were appointed out of political loyalty and not 
because of militiary expertise. Not only did this lead to the wrong 
man getting the job but it also alienated the capable young officers 
whose services were badly needed. Batista, Somoza and the shah 
all rotated general's command's so that they could not establish
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an independent power base within the military. It is also difficult 
for even the best trained military men with the highest morale to 
fire upon crowds of their own countrymen.
If the military is weak there are two factors which will determine 
how long the regime will stay in power. First, there needs to be 
a strong revolutionary movement trying to overthrow it. However, 
even if there is such a movement the regime can be kept in power 
through foreign intervention. Such interventions can only be a 
stop-gap measure. In present day Afghanistan the Kabul goverment 
is unlikely to fall so long as it is supported by the military might 
of the Soviet Union. On the other hand, should the USSR withdraw 
its support, the Afghan government would face a fresh challenge 
from the rebel forces.
Through testing this theory it soon becomes clear that while all 
the factors within my theory do exist in each of the case studies, 
their importance varies from revolution to revolution. Ideology 
was particularly important in Iran, yet in Cuba that part was played 
by political discontent. I believe with this weighting in mind 
my theory is extremely useful when adopted as a causal framework 
for the study of contemporary revolutions.
Finally, I would like to consider some directions for future research. 
Despite the high cost of revolution, both in financial and human 
terms, these three case studies would seem to point to the inability 
of the western world both to predict and prevent revolution.(9)
It is the responsibility of the social scientist to prove the tools 
for predicting revolution. This will not be done by twisting the 
"classical revolutions", providing another revolutionary theory 
to be refuted by still other social scientists. What must be done 
is to decide on a theoretical approach, be it psychological or casual 
or both, and to actively test it against contemporary revolutions.
We also need to consider those revolutions which have failed so
Page 90
that we can identify those factors which prevent them from being 
successful revolutions. Finally, we need to use the same criteria 
to study troubled nations over a number of years so we can identify 
trends which could lead to a revolution. This will not enable us 
to state that a revolution will take place but will tell us that
a revolutionary situation is possible. We are much more likely
to uncover this information using the same critieria over a number 
of years than by undertaking spasmodic subjective studies using 
the theory deemed to be the most popular at the time.
It is very easy for the social scientist to concentrate on revolutions 
which are well past. There is plenty of data on them and they are 
now safely non-controversial. However, we live in a contemporary, 
controversial society and we all fail that society if we do not




(1) By "classical" revolution I am refering to those in the French 
and Russian genre whilst "contemporary" revolutions I see
as being those post 1950
(2) See table 3
(3) The difference in living standards between rural and urban 
Cuba was marked.
(4) The "Foco" is the base for guerilla activity. Special attention 
is given to it by both Mao& Giap
(5) After the Cuban revolution had been successful there was much 
argument over which faction rural or urban had done most to 
bring about the collapse of the Batista government. Both 
Castro & Guevarra supported the peasant fighters.
(6) The population of Tehran rose from 2.5 million in 1970 to 
5 million in 1977
(7) See E. Rouleau
Iran: The myth and reality. The Gaurdian Weekly, October 24, 
1976
(8) See table 7
(9) See R. Fagen, The End of the Affair
Foreign Policy No 36 (Summer 1980) p 178 for a discussion 
on America's seemingly inability to predict revolution
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1953 5.879 1794 100
1954 6.000 1808 97
1955 6.127 1859 96
1956 6.259 2015 97
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RANKING ACCORDING TO PER CAPITA 
INCOME AND AVERAGES OF PHYSICAL INDEXES













10 Dominican Republic 11
This Table is taken from Teichart, p185 
Cuban Resources
Pedro C.M. Teichart, Analysis of Real Growth and Wealth in Latin 
American Republics.
Journal of Inter-American Studies, vol1 no2 (April 1959), p173-202.
United Nations, Economic Survey of Latin America 1960, New York, 1961.
Unesco, Basic Facts and Figures, Paris 1961.
University of California, Centre of Latin American Studies.
Statistical Abstract of Latin American 1960, Los Angeles, 1960.
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TABLE 6
A COMPARISON BETWEEN DEFENCE SPENDING & OIL INCOME FROM 1970-1978
Defence Budget $ million Oil Income $ million
1970 880 1 093
1971 1 065 1 870
1972 1 375 2 308
1973 1 525 5 600
1974 3 680 18 523
1975 6 325 18 871
1976 8 925 20
COCO
1977 9 400 -
1978 — 17 000
IRANIAN SOURCES
United Nations, Statistical Yearbook for Asia and Africa, 1979/80
United Nations, Statistical Yearbook, 1978
the Economist, The World in Figures, New York 1978
US Military Sales to Iran, Staff Report to the Subcommittee on 
Foreign Assistance of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 
Washington, 1976, p13. Cited in Fred Haliday, Iran: Dictatorship 
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